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ABSTRACT
STUDENT CYBERSPEECH TARGETING FACULTY: WHAT CAN SCHOOL
ADMINISTRATORS LEGALLY DO ABOUT IT?
Bradley L Shortridge, Ed.D.
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Northern Illinois University, 2015
Christine Kiracofe, Director

This paper investigates how school officials can make sound decisions based on
appropriate legal precedent when faced with incidents of student cyberspeech targeting staff
members. In particular, this study examined court decisions, law review articles, state and
federal legislation, online sources, and newspaper articles relating to student speech issues.
Analyzing these decisions offers some insight for school administrators faced with these
instances. Trends from various cases at different court levels are discussed, and some
recommendations and tips for school administrators are provided.
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Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY

General Research Problem
As the internet expansion made new forms of communication available on a
worldwide scale in 1994, it has spawned new ways to socially communicate.1 Unfortunately,
these new ways of communicating have been associated with incidents of school violence and
offensive cyberspeech since then.2 Some scholars claim it is these incidents that have put
pressure on legislatures and school officials to pass tougher laws and to implement stricter
discipline policies to punish cyberbullying and other inappropriate cyberspeech.3 But the
internet has made administrative decisions regarding student discipline very difficult because
of their competing interests in protecting students and staff members from potentially
threatening expression while at the same time allowing students to exercise their
constitutionally protected rights to free speech.4
School administrators have always had the power to control on-campus student
expression and have additionally had at least some authority to discipline students for

1

And the „Global Village‟ Became a Reality, Internet Growth Statistics,
http://www.internetworldstats.com/emarketing.htm
2
Harriet A. Hader, Supervising Cyberspace: A Simple Threshold for Public School Jurisdiction Over Students’
Online Activity. 50 B.C. L. Rev 1563, 1566 (2009).
3
Id.
4
Christine Metteer Lorillard, When Children’s Rights “Collide”: Free Speech vs. The Right to Be Let Alone in
the Context of Off-Campus “Cyber-bullying.” 81 Miss. L.J. 189, 194 (2011).

2
activity which occurred off school grounds. However, where administrators have exercised
that authority to impose discipline for off-campus activity, most of those situations involved
fighting or alcohol/drug use and the punishment concerned the taking away of participation
rights in extra-curricular activities.5 The ongoing challenge, then, is to determine just how far
school administrators can and should reach when dealing with incidents of off-campus student
cyberspeech used to attack faculty members.6
Though fighting, arguing, and various types of bullying behaviors are not uncommon
among students, cyberbullying of students and staff members is relatively new and has
opened up avenues for students to attack school personnel. Some scholars believe bullying
and being critical of school personnel have been accepted by some as normal adolescent
behavior. On the contrary, there never has been anything normal about any form of bullying
as part of growing up.7 In fact, bullying and cyberbullying incidents can have serious negative
impacts on both the physical and the psychological health and ultimately the success of
victims.8 Methods of non-physical assault in the form of aggressive cyberspeech can be as
harmful to victims as actual punches and in-your-face threats.9 They can obstruct teachers‟
ability to adequately perform their job and may inhibit a student victim‟s capability to grow
physically and to mentally succeed in school.10 According to some scholars, the negative

5

Todd D. Erb, A Case for Strengthening School District Jurisdiction to Punish Off-Campus Incidents of
Cyberbullying. 40 Ariz. St. L.J. 257, 258 (2008).
6
Nancy Willard, School Response to Cyberbullying and Sexting: The Legal Challenges. 2011 BYU Educ. & L.J.
75, 75 (2011).
7
Julie Sacks & Robert S. Salem, Victims Without Legal Remedies: Why Kids Need Schools to Develop
Comprehensive Anti-bullying Policies. 72 Alb. L. Rev. 147, 147 (2009).
8
Id.
9
Jill Grim, Peer Harassment in Our Schools: Should Teachers and Administrators Join the Fight? 10 Barry L.
Rev. 155, 159 (2008).
10
Id.

3
physiological effects cyberbullied victims experience, such as insomnia, unexplainable head
and body aches, large swings in weight, and even incontinence, cannot be ignored by school
officials.11 The negative effects of cyberbullying on victims has also been acknowledged by
the medical community. According to the National Association of School Psychologists,
cyberbullying can create a demoralizing school environment, hindering victims from being
able to function normally.12 In addition, Jennifer Caudle, a medical researcher, believes
cyberbullied victims are often unhappy, feel lonely, have sleep difficulties, and exhibit
symptoms of anxiety and depression.13
With those serious consequences in mind, making decisions about how to respond to
aggressive student expression, particularly cyberspeech incidents, may be frustrating for
school administrators because although these incidents are being produced away from school,
they are certainly felt at school.14 What is even more confusing for administrators is the fact
that, to date, the legal system has not sent clear messages regarding how school leaders may
deal with student cyberspeech incidents.15 When faced with incidents of student speech
occurring off school grounds, it would seem that courts would hold similar opinions. But,
district courts and appellate courts have handed down apparently conflicting rulings in student
cyberspeech cases.16 One possible explanation for this lack of clarity is that the internet is a

11

Id.
Ted Feinberg and Nicole Robey, “Cyberbullying.” Principal Leadership, September 2008.
www.nasponline.org July 2, 2013.
13
“Cyberbullying and Its Effect on Our Youth.” American Osteopathic Association, www.osteopathic.org. July
2, 2013.
14
Global Village, supra note 1, at 273.
15
Id. at 274.
16
Louis John Seminski, Jr., Tinkering with Student Free Speech: The Internet and the Need for a New Standard.
33 Rutgers L. J. 165, 183 (2001).
12
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new medium and the Supreme Court has not provided guidance on its definition or associated
First Amendment parameters.17 The struggle courts have experienced with this student
cyberspeech issue was highlighted by the Third Circuit Court in 2011. In that year, not even
the same court could hand down an initial ruling that seemed congruent. In opinions filed on
the same day, the Third Circuit originally handed down rulings which appeared to conflict
with one another (though the Third Circuit has since met en banc and clarified these decisions
by adjusting one of the rulings so that the decisions are similar).18 In Layshock v. Hermitage,
the Third Circuit concluded school officials could not discipline a student who, using his
grandmother‟s computer at her home, created an internet profile of the school principal which
was both disparaging and somewhat vulgar.19 On the same day that it ruled in favor of the
student in Layshock, the Third Circuit in J.S. v. Blue Mountain School District ruled against a
student who had created a MySpace webpage targeting her principal with sexually explicit
epithets and adult themes.20 In an en banc review, the Third Circuit reversed course on the
Blue Mountain ruling, deciding school officials did in fact violate J.S.‟s First Amendment
rights by suspending her for the cyberspeech attack on the principal which she posted on
MySpace.21 Even in cases featuring similar facts, the same circuit court can have difficulty
making clear rulings on student cyberspeech issues. Though case law is very fact dependent
and the outcomes of each individual case are ultimately determined by those unique facts, the
initial rulings in these two Third Circuit cases were perplexing.
17

Id.
First Amendment- Student Speech- Third Circuit Applies Tinker to Off-Campus Student Speech- J.S. ex rel.
Snyder v. Blue Mountain School District, 125 Harv. L. Rev. 1064, 1066 (2012).
19
Layshock v. Hermitage School District, 650 F.3d 205 (3d Cir. 2011).
20
J.S. v. Blue Mountain School District, 593 F.3d 286 (3d Cir. 2010).
21
J.S. v. Blue Mountain School District, 650 F.3d 915 (3d Cir. 2011).
18

5
Though the Third Circuit seems to believe that school officials do not have authority
to regulate the cyber conduct of students from their homes, other circuits, like the Fourth,
appear to hold a different opinion.22 For example, the Fourth Circuit held in Kowalski v.
Berkeley County Schools23 that student speech which was created away from school can
develop into speech within the school walls based on at whom the speech is directed and what
happens as a result.24 Consequently, say some researchers, such student speech then could be
controlled and subdued by school authorities.25 This Fourth Circuit interpretation appears to
give much power to school administrators to curb the First Amendment rights of students.26 It
is also possible that the vagueness of the Supreme Court‟s voice on this issue has led to the
ambiguity and circuit court splits.27
Other researchers, however, believe that the Fourth Circuit has a point when it seeks to
determine the on-campus/off-campus nature of cyberspeech and that the Third Circuit should
conduct similar analyses.28 This line of thinking promotes the notion that courts should first
seek to categorize student speech as either on-campus or off-campus. The Third Circuit could
have determined Layshock‟s speech to be on-campus since his admitted objective was to
amuse students at school, he made it widely available for people connected to the school, he

22

Rory Allen Weeks, The First Amendment, Public School Students, and the Need for Clear Limits on School
Officials’ Authority Over Off-Campus Student Speech. 46 Ga. L. Rev. 1157, 1178 (2012).
23
See generally Kowalski v. Berkeley County Schools, 652 F.3d 565 (4th Cir. 2011).
24
Weeks, supra note 22, at 1182.
25
Id.
26
Id. at 1189.
27
Id. at 1189, 1192.
28
Matthew Beatus, Layshock ex rel. Layshock v. Hermitage School District. 56 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 785, 789
(2011/2012). The analyses would focus on whether speech could become on-campus even if created off-campus
but is either accessed while on school property or if the speech is aimed at individuals who attend or work at the
school. Beatus at 794-795.

6
accessed it while at school and he persuaded others to do so.29 Furthermore, the facts of this
case differ from Snyder and thus a different opinion could have been warranted because in
Blue Mountain the cyberspeech did not travel to school grounds, while students did view
Layshock‟s cyberspeech at school.30
Finally, schools are commonly slow to react to changes in technology, and
inappropriate student cyberspeech issues are often characterized by the use of technology to
harass or disparage another.31 Scholars affirm that the courts and the laws which address
student cyberspeech are woefully behind in providing guidance on how to deal with student
cyberspeech issues.32 Courts generally tackle this topic by referring to Supreme Court
decisions which were decided long before the internet was created.33 However, these
standard-bearing cases all addressed on-campus student speech.34 School officials have to be
frustrated and confused with how to handle off-campus student cyberspeech that has a
negative impact within the walls of the school on staff members, students, and on school
climate.35

29

Id. at 795.
Id. at 801.
31
Karly Zande, When the School Bully Attacks in the Living Room: Using Tinker to Regulate Off-Campus
Student Cyberbulling. 13 Barry L. Rev. 103, 106 (2009).
32
Id. at 129.
33
Bradley Gibson, Doninger v. Niehoff: Tinker Is Online and in Trouble. 36 N. Ky. L. Rev. 185, 187 (2009).
34
Id.
35
Global Village, supra note 1, at 271.
30
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Rationale for the Study
The internet distributes messages and pictures to a huge audience in a short amount of
time.36 When student online activity occurs at home, those students generally enjoy the free
speech protections guaranteed by the First Amendment.37 Because the lives of elementary and
secondary school students often revolve around the school, the effects of online student
activity, even those activities which occur away from school, frequently are brought to
campus through cell phones, print-outs, school computers, and general student conversation.38
If staff members feel threatened while at school as a result of the online conduct of students
which takes place when they are away from school, under what circumstances may the
Constitution support school administrators when they discipline students for such off-campus
behavior?
School administrators are in a difficult position when trying to decide how to handle
any student speech, especially cyberspeech, that occurs off-campus.39 To date, court decisions
regarding student expression leave much confusion and very little guidance for
administrators, particularly their authority over off-campus cyberspeech.40 Scholars note that
administrators applying the same rules for off-campus speech and harassment as for that
which occurs on-campus is problematic because it potentially could to unfairly chill a

36

Hader, supra note 2, at 1566.
Bethel School Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986) at 682.
38
Hader, supra note 2, at 1564.
39
Porter v. Ascension Parish School Board, 393 F.3d 608 (5th Cir. 2004) at 621.
40
Zande, supra note 31, at 129. Zande references the differing opinions in Layshock and Blue Mountain and
goes on to discuss the disparate opinions in other cases: “Courts in Thomas and Porter ruled that schools could
not curtail off-campus speech under any circumstances, while other courts have ruled that schools can, provided
the speech meets a variety of differing tests.”
37

8
student‟s First Amendment right to expression.41 There are a number of court rulings
involving school administrators disciplining students for their cyberspeech activity, though
the decisions do not provide school administrators with clear direction.42 For example, if the
school disciplines a student for her cyberspeech, then it may be liable for violating the First
Amendment rights of the student being disciplined.43 However, if the school decides not to
discipline the student for aggressive, intimidating, or otherwise inappropriate student
cyberspeech, then that lack of action may be perceived as a school district endorsement of the
speech.44
Making the decisions for administrators regarding cyberspeech even more difficult is
the current heightened sensitivity in the U.S. regarding cyberspeech and cyberbullying. Many
state legislatures have addressed these issues by passing laws and mandates for school
districts regarding inappropriate cyberspeech.45 Some scholars fear this legislative emphasis
on student cyberspace may give school administrators an unrestrained sense of power to
unduly diminish students‟ rights because under some definitions of bullying and
41

Hader, supra note 2, at 1568.
See Sypniewski v. Warren Hills Regional High School, 307 F.3d 243 (3rd Cir. 2002), where the court upheld a
school district‟s right to curtail inflammatory speech; J.C. v. Beverly Hills Unified School District, 711 F. Supp.
2d 1094 (C.D. Cal. 2010), in which the court held that the school district did not have the right to punish a
student for posting a video to YouTube which contained hurtful and arguably harassing content. In D.C. v. R.R.,
182 Cal. App. 4th 1190 (2010), the court found that threatening comments one student made toward another via
website posting were not protected speech.
43
See generally Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, 393 U.S. 503 (1969), J.C. v.
Beverly Hills Unified School District, 711 F. Supp. 2d 1094 (C.D. Cal. 2010); D.C. v. R.R., 182 Cal. App. 4th
1190 (Cal. App. 2010).
44
Bethel School Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 680 (1986).
45
www.cyberbullying.us, July, 2012. This website was created and continues to be updated and managed by Dr.
Justin W. Patchin, Associate Professor of Criminal Justice in the Department of Political Science at the
University of Wisconsin-Eau Claire, and Dr. Sameer Hinduja, Associate Professor in the School of Criminology
and Criminal Justice at Florida Atlantic University. They are co-directors of the Cyberbullying Research Center
and have published numerous books and research articles in scholarly publications like the Journal of Youth and
Adolescence, European Journal of Developmental Psychology, Journal of School Health, Computers in Human
Behavior, Youth and Society, and the Journal of School Violence. See Appendix A for a list of statutes by state.
42
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cyberbullying, almost any student action, perhaps as innocuous as sending an email or text
which is misinterpreted to sending a purposefully mean or metaphorical middle finger to
another, may be considered bullying and punishable.46 Furthermore, some scholars claim
schools already wield too much power in this area. If schools can discipline and censor any
student activity on the internet that might end up coming into the schoolhouse yard, “then the
potential jurisdiction of school power over students‟ online activity would be limitless.”47
Other scholars believe school officials are far better equipped and trained to decide what
student speech should be dealt with as causing harm to the school environment and those in
that environment than are law enforcement officials and courts.48 Police are already
overburdened with more dangerous activity like burglaries and assaults and are far less versed
and thus less willing to work with parents to resolve inappropriate cyberspeech instances.49

Purpose of the Study
The purpose of this study is to help school administrators navigate the pertinent law
cases which relate to student cyberspeech targeting school faculty and staff. This will be
accomplished through the examination of court decisions, law review articles, state and
federal legislation, and newspaper articles regarding incidences of student cyberspeech used
to attack school personnel. These sources will be used to build a body of knowledge regarding
46

Nan Stein, Bullying or Sexual Harassment? The Missing Discourse of Rights in an Era of Zero Tolerance. 45
Ariz. L. Rev. 783, 794 (2003).
47
Hader, supra note 2, at 1598.
48
Zande, supra note 31, at 133.
49
Erb, supra note 5, at 283.
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student cyberspeech issues, to gather information pertaining to how courts have responded to
cases brought before them dealing with school districts‟ disciplining for such behavior, and to
ascertain current trends and outline categories associated with relevant law and constitutional
parameters in an effort to inform the decision making of school officials.

Research Questions
1. What are the factors school administrators should consider regarding the relevant legal
history of student rights pertaining to their First Amendment free speech rights?
2. What do school administrators need to know regarding the current legal status of
student rights pertaining to discipline in connection with incidents of student
cyberspeech aimed at staff members?
3. How can prior litigation and court rulings inform the decisions of school
administrators when faced with incidents of student cyberspeech that targets adults
connected with the school?

Delimitations
This study is delimited to an examination of cases involving student off-campus
speech targeting school staff members. It investigates federal and state court cases which have
addressed First Amendment student rights. The cases reviewed pertain specifically to student
First Amendment cyberspeech incidents.

11
Definitions
Bullying
Aggressive acts by one or more students with positions of power over the victim. The
aggressive acts are made with the intent to repeatedly cause harm.50
Certiorari
To be more fully informed. This is the mechanism by which the U.S. Supreme Court picks
most of the cases that it hears. While a decision to deny certiorari keeps the lower court's
ruling intact, it does not constitute a decision by the Supreme Court on any of the legal issues
raised by the case.51
Cyberbullying
A form of harassment characterized by the aggressor using electronic means like Facebook,
email, or text messages to threaten, outcast, ridicule, or embarrass other students.52
Cyberspeech
Expression (in this study, incidences of student speech) posted on the internet.53
En banc
By the full court; When all judges of a court hear a case. Some appellate courts which have a
large number of judges and a large caseload often divide into divisions or panels for each
case. For example, United States Appeals Court cases are usually heard by three-judge panels.
Sometimes, on the request of the panel or one of the litigants, the case is later reheard by the
full court: or, en banc.54
Facebook
A free social networking internet site which allows registered users to create their own
personal profiles, upload photos and videos, send messages, and keep in touch with friends
and family members.
Facebook friends
A person who a Facebook user has invited to be a Facebook friend. If the invitation is
accepted, then the two people have access to one another‟s status updates, to message one
another, and to participate in group chats.

50

Hader, supra note 2, at 148.
Cornell University Law School, Legal Information Institute. http://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/certiorari
52
Erb, supra note 5, at 157.
53
Jacob Tabor, Students’ First Amendment Rights in the Age of the Internet: Off-Campus Cyberspeech and
School Regulation. 50 B.C. L. Rev 561, 562 (2009).
54
Tech Law Journal. http://www.techlawjournal.com/glossary/legal/enbanc.htm
51
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MySpace
Social networking site that allows its users to create webpages to interact with other users.55
Nexus
A point of causal intersection, link, relation, or connection.56 In the case of cyberspeech, the
term pertains to whether the student speech, (for example, an email sent using school
computers) is considered on-campus or off-campus speech.
Precedent
A court decision that is cited as an example or analogy to resolve similar questions of law in
later cases.
Public forum
A place where access to public property exists for speech-related pursuits.
School-sponsored speech
Speech that a reasonable observer would view as the school's own speech.57
Summary judgment
A request for a decision by a court of the matters submitted to it based upon legal arguments
only, where no material facts are in dispute.58
True threat
Speech communicating a credible intent of violence against a person or group.59

55

http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/Myspace.html
Black‟s Law Dictionary Free Online Legal Dictionary, 2nd Ed.
http://thelawdictionary.org/nexus/#ixzz2kM8tMDMN
57
Killion v. Franklin Regional School District, 136 F. Supp. 2d 446, 453 (W.D. Pa. 2001).
58
Tech Law Journal. http://www.techlawjournal.com/glossary/legal/summary.htm
59
Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359 (2003).
56

Chapter 2
REVIEW OF LITERATURE

Social Media
In May of 2013, the Pew Research Center reported “94% of teen social media users
said they had a Facebook profile, and 81% of this population said Facebook was the profile
they used most often.”60 A recently interviewed teen student claimed Facebook, with
approximately 1.15 billion users,61 and other similar social media sites, provided avenues for
students to say things they otherwise would not say “in real life.”62 Clearly some students
view cyberspace and internet places like Facebook as a fantasyland where consequences are
of no consideration. One newspaper reporter proclaimed the internet to be “the new bathroom
wall – the virtual place kids scrawl something when they want to be mean.”63 Cloaked in the
illusion of invisibility, some students are using internet sites like Facebook to harass,
intimidate, disparage, and in some cases threaten others, including school staff members.64

60

Mary Madden, Teens Haven’t Abandoned Facebook (Yet), Pew Internet & American Life Project (Aug 15,
2013),
http://pewinternet.org/Commentary/2013/August/Teens-Havent-Abandoned-Facebook-Yet.aspx.
61
Joshua Sophy, Facebook Keeps Growing: Now at 1.15 Billion Active Users, Small Business Trends (July 28,
2013), http://smallbiztrends.com/2013/07/facebook-reaches-1-billion-active-members.html.
62
Amanda Hess, Teenagers Hate Facebook, but They're Not Logging Off, (May 22, 2013, at 12:29 PM),
http://www.slate.com/blogs/xx_factor/2013/05/22/teenagers_hate_facebook_a_pew_study_says_that_94_percent
_of_teens_use_facebook.html.
63
Sharon Noguchie, Cyberbullies a Growing Problem at School, San Jose Mercury News, Jan. 13, 2008, at 1B.
64
Shannon L. Doering, Tinkering with School Discipline in the Name of the First Amendment: Expelling a
Teacher’s Ability to Proactively Quell Disruptions Caused by Cyberbullies at the Schoolhouse. 87 Neb. L. Rev.
630, 635-636 (2009).
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This new form of harassment, often termed “cyberbullying,” can have disruptive effects on
school faculty, staff, and students.65 Often, the cyber-aggressor seeks First Amendment
protection if school administrators act to discipline such behavior.66 Decisions regarding
discipline for student cyber-communication are difficult for school administrators to address
because cyber-communication distorts the borders between on-campus speech and off-campus
speech.67 For example, some administrators and parents may perceive a student‟s Facebook
post created at home on her own computer as private communication protected by the First
Amendment.68 On the other hand, others may see the post as being so readily available it may
be treated as on-campus expression.69 And if that online communication causes disruptions at
school, then it is arguably subject to discipline as on-campus speech.70 The broad access
students enjoy today to both on-campus and off-campus online communication often forces
school administrators to make difficult decisions regarding the effect of student cyberspeech
on the school environment.71 Because the Supreme Court has not yet ruled on a case
specifically involving student cyberspeech, courts and school administrators are finding
making decisions regarding this issue challenging.72
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Protecting Students’ First Amendment Speech Rights
In 1967, the Supreme Court in Keyishian v. Board of Regents asserted protecting First
Amendment speech rights was a crucial part of public school education, calling the classroom
“the marketplace of ideas” and declaring that the nation‟s future was dependent upon a
“robust exchange of ideas.”73 However, the Supreme Court has also made clear its position
that First Amendment speech rights are not without borders.74 The Court has identified forms
of speech which should not enjoy constitutional protection. The list has included speech
considered “lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or „fighting‟
words.”75 In addition, in Virginia v. Black, the Supreme Court asserted true threats of violence
are also unprotected by the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.76 It is student
cyberspeech targeting staff members which may fall into one of these unprotected categories,
and if so, such speech receives no First Amendment protection.77
Though the Supreme Court has not yet heard a case specifically involving student
cyberspeech, it has ruled on four major cases regarding student speech and its First
Amendment implications. In Tinker v. Des Moines,78 Bethel v. Fraser,79 Hazelwood v.
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Kuhlmeier,80 and Morse v. Frederick,81 all of which will be discussed in detail later, the
Supreme Court has identified types of student speech that do not enjoy First Amendment
protection when expressed at school. Some scholars suggest there is a subtle line between
student speech that encourages the spirit of the First Amendment and student speech which
should not enjoy protection.82 Though the Supreme Court has not heard a case specifically
involving student cyberspeech, it has made rulings regarding student speech and their First
Amendment implications, which lower courts have applied to today‟s instances of student
cyberspeech.
The terms “speech” and “expression” are synonymous and can be communicated in a
variety of ways. For example, displaying a flag or wearing a button can serve as a sign or
symbol to communicate a political message in the same way as actual spoken words.83 The
first of the four Supreme Court student free speech cases, Tinker v. Des Moines,84 decided in
1969, exemplifies the range of constitutional protection student speech enjoys and provides
standards for courts to use when deciding cases involving student expression.85
In Tinker and the other three major Supreme Court student speech cases, the Court has
addressed school officials‟ authority to limit student speech rights.86 And though none of the
four Supreme Court cases involving student First Amendment free speech rights contemplated
the impact of internet speech in a school setting, any exploration of students‟ free speech
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rights must include these decisions because each ruling provides guidelines for the types of
student speech school officials can suppress and what types of student speech is
constitutionally protected. As such, these Supreme Court decisions are the only benchmarks
available to school administrators as precedents for basing their decisions when handling
student cyberspeech incidents.87 Though these four Supreme Court decisions did not involve
nor contemplate student cyberspeech, these rulings currently stand as the source of guidance
to both lower courts and school leaders in responding to student cyberspeech.

The Four Landmark Supreme Court Student Speech Cases
Tinker v. Des Moines (1969)
In 1969, the Supreme Court began delineating the parameters of student speech rights
within the public school gates in Tinker v. Des Moines.88 The Tinker particulars entailed a
group of students (including two children from the Tinker family) and their parents who came
together in December 1965 to determine a method for showing support for ending the fighting
in Viet Nam.89 They decided one of the ways to visibly show this support was to wear
armbands during the Christmas season.90 When Des Moines school officials became aware of
the students‟ plans to wear armbands to school, they swiftly created and publicized rules
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forbidding students from wearing armbands under penalty of suspension.91 Even though the
students were aware of the school rule prohibiting the wearing of armbands, they wore the
armbands to school. Clearly this act was one the students and their parents created; it could
not be confused as being sponsored by the school district. After all, the wearing of armbands
was not part of a school newspaper or broadcast nor could it have been confused with other
school-district-endorsed speech, like a poster or event. There were a couple of minor incidents
connected to the armbands92 but there were no threats or actual violent episodes at school in
response to the armbands.93 Nonetheless, as promised, school officials sent the students home,
suspending them until they agreed to return without the armbands.94
Thereafter the students and their parents filed a lawsuit in the United States District
Court for the Southern District of Iowa,95 alleging officials had violated the students‟ free
speech rights by prohibiting the wearing of armbands. The students contended the wearing of
armbands was a form of speech protected by the First Amendment.96 The district court
considered the question of “whether the action of officials of the defendant school district
forbidding the wearing of arm bands on school facilities deprived the plaintiffs of
constitutional rights secured by the freedom of speech clause of the First Amendment.”97
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The court referred to a couple of cases, including the 1943 case West Virginia State
Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette,98 which acknowledged the Constitution protected a student‟s right to
free speech. The court further noted wearing an armband to express a political view
constituted speech protected by the Constitution.99 The court, however, asserted this
protection was not absolute.100 The court weighed prohibiting the speech (armbands) by a
state actor (in this case, the school district) against what the prohibition was actually
attempting to achieve.101 The court asserted school officials have the daunting task of
providing a classroom environment free from disruption.102 It continued by stating courts
should not interfere with the operations of a school district if the actions of school officials
were reasonable.103
In addition, the district court noted that while the First Amendment did protect the
expression of views by the wearing of an armband,104 First Amendment protections in certain
circumstances, within the public school environment, may not always apply.105 As it sought to
determine the reasonableness of the school officials‟ actions, the court recognized the need to

98

West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, 258 F. Supp 971, 972 (S.D. Iowa 1966).
100
Id.
101
Id.
102
Id.
103
Id.
104
Id.
105
Id. Specifically, the court acknowledged school administrators were duty-bound to take reasonable measures
to avert material and substantial interference with the education of students. Cases cited were: Pocket Books, Inc.
v. Walsh, 204 F. Supp. 297 (D.Conn.1962), which involved a suit against law enforcement which prohibited a
book store from selling a particular book the police deemed obscene; Near v. State of Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697
(1931), concerning a publisher who printed scandalous material attacking local officials. The officials obtained
an injunction prohibiting the publishing of the scandal sheet, and the publisher filed suit; Dennis v. United States,
341 U.S. 494 (1951), a case about the arrest and conviction of Communist Party of America leaders because they
allegedly violated the Smith Act, which prohibited anyone from working to overthrow the government of the
United States.
99

20
be mindful of the existing controversy in the country regarding the U.S. involvement in Viet
Nam.106 For example, when the school district rule forbidding armbands was put into effect,
Washington D.C. had recently been the site of a protest march against the war.107 In addition,
at that time, the Supreme Court had two high-profile draft card burning cases pending.108
Finally, during the Des Moines School Board meeting featuring the board‟s vote in favor of
the armband prohibition, individuals on both sides of this issue spoke with animation as they
expressed their emotions.109
The district court noted teachers and school officials should not commonly exclude an
issue from instruction merely because it is contentious.110 However, wearing armbands at
school in opposition to the U.S. involvement in Viet Nam created a potential for disruption
within the school environment and therefore the prohibition was justified from the
administrators‟ perspective.111 The district court pointed out a contrast between: a) the
wearing of armbands to express a political view and b) the protected freedom students would
enjoy during a discussion of the Viet Nam conflict in “the disciplined atmosphere of the
classroom.”112 The court observed though the armbands themselves did not cause classroom
disruption, it was not unreasonable for school administrators to adopt the armband prohibition
to defend against the possibility that other students‟ reactions to the armbands could foment a
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disruption.113 The court opined the interest of maintaining an orderly school environment
should prevail over the rights of students to wear armbands at school.114 Finally, the district
court observed “it was not unreasonable for” school administrators to anticipate a display of
the armbands “would create some type of classroom disturbance.”115 Given the competing
interests, i.e., student speech rights vs. school leaders‟ responsibility to maintain a disciplined
classroom learning atmosphere, Judge Stevenson concluded the need for an orderly classroom
environment should prevail.116 Thus, the district court dismissed the students‟ complaint.117
The students appealed the lower court decision to the Eighth Circuit.118 The case was
originally argued before a regular panel of the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals and then was
subsequently heard again en banc.119 An equally divided en banc panel affirmed the decision
of the district court.120 The Supreme Court accepted the case for review and reversed the
lower court‟s decision finding school officials had indeed infringed on the students‟
constitutional right to free expression.121
First, Justice Fortas, in writing the Court‟s opinion, identified the central issue facing
the Court as the friction created when students break school rules in their quest to express
their opinions in such a way that may be protected by the First Amendment.122 The Court held
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that public schools cannot wield unlimited power over students and “state-operated schools
may not be enclaves of totalitarianism.”123 Among the rights the Court contended students
enjoyed was the freedom to evince their own views in school, not just the views that school
officials deemed appropriate and uncontroversial.124 The Court determined disciplining
students for wearing armbands was unreasonable in the absence of evidence suggesting this
conduct would cause a disruption.125 And the evidence revealed school officials only
conjectured a disruption might occur. The Court determined the district court erred in
concluding school administrators were justified in their decision to forbid the wearing of
armbands due to anxiety over a disruption that might occur, noting, “Fear of a disturbance is
not enough to overcome the right to freedom of expression.”126 The Court held the
suppression of speech by school officials cannot be allowed simply to “avoid the discomfort
and unpleasantness that always accompany an unpopular viewpoint,” which is exactly what
the Supreme Court determined drove the decision of the district court.127 The Court found no
indication that armband wearing would lead to disruption of the “work of the school or
impinge upon the rights of other students.”128 The Court pointed out the minor disruptions
that did occur as a result of the armbands were insignificant compared to the First
Amendment violations school officials committed.129 For example, during the district court
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trial, there was evidence presented that discussion about the armbands took place in the school
hallway and one teacher reported a lesson was “wrecked” as students quarreled with Mary
Beth Tinker about her armband.130 However, the Supreme Court did not find these minor
instances equated to a substantial disruption.
In addition, the Tinker Court opined that wearing armbands “was closely akin to pure
speech,” which had been protected by the Court in other cases, equating the term “pure
speech” to political speech or a passive expression of opinion.131 Furthermore, the Court
wrote “It can hardly be argued that either students or teachers shed their constitutional rights
to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate.”132 The Court found it relevant
that armbands were singled out for prohibition while other forms of political expression
remained allowable.133 For example, students were allowed to wear buttons pertaining to
political campaigns while others were permitted to wear the Iron Cross, which was commonly
associated with Nazism.134 The Court reasoned that proscribing one specific type of
expression of one political stance, while allowing others, could not withstand First
Amendment scrutiny.135
Justice Black‟s dissenting opinion is instructive. From the outset, Justice Black
asserted that the Constitution does not afford anyone the right to express views via speech or
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demonstration “where he pleases and when he pleases.”136 He went on to say, “Our Court has
decided precisely the opposite.”137 Justice Black, in his dissent, believed there was indeed
disruption in the school as a result of the armbands. He pointed to the situation where
altercations over Mary Beth Tinker‟s wearing of the armband in class “wrecked” an entire
class period.138 Justice Black wrote this occurrence indicated school administrators‟ fears
actually came to fruition. That is, the wearing of the armbands served to distract students from
educational endeavors.139 Again, the majority did not find this event a significant or material
disruption. Justice Black expressed concern over any court meddling in the affairs of school
administrators‟ attempts to discipline students for blatantly disregarding school rules.140
Justice Black reasoned students in the public schools should not be sharing views on “politics
by actual speech, or by „symbolic‟ speech.”141 Furthermore, he warned the majority opinion
potentially allowed the First Amendment to be used as a vehicle to force “teachers, parents,
and elected officials to surrender control of the American public school system to public
school students.”142
The Court‟s opinion served to lay out the parameters for student expression that have
been referenced in numerous subsequent lower court opinions. The first prong of the Tinker
test provides public school students the right to express their views as long as the speech does
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not materially and substantially interfere with the necessary operations of the school. 143 The
second prong notes student expression cannot infringe on the rights of others.144 In Tinker, the
Court found no evidence that the wearing of armbands offended either standard.
Though the Tinker Court laid out two distinct ways student expression can be limited,
subsequent court decisions have relied almost exclusively on the first prong and ignored the
second. The second prong of the test sought to protect others who might be negatively
affected by the speech. The Court proclaimed student speech which invades “the rights of
others is … not immunized by the constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech.”145 This
verbiage related back to the dissenting opinion of Justice Louis Brandeis in the 1928 Supreme
Court decision Olmstead v. U.S.146 In that case, Justice Brandeis‟ dissent asserted the United
States Constitution provided civilized citizens the broad and valuable right to be left alone.147
He further stressed this right must be protected and any invasion of the right to be left alone
was a violation of the Constitution.148 Even though courts have referenced the first prong
many times when making decisions regarding cases of student First Amendment expression
rights, it may be that the second prong will emerge as being more applicable to student
cyberspeech cases.
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Bethel v. Fraser (1986)
Seventeen years passed before the Supreme Court heard another First Amendment
student speech case. Just as in Tinker, the student speech in the 1986 case Bethel v. Fraser149
occurred on school grounds. Bethel High School student Matthew Fraser gave a student
council campaign speech before 600 of his fellow students at a school-sponsored assembly.150
Though he had previously discussed the content of the speech with two teachers who warned
Fraser not to give it, he delivered it anyway.151 The speech was laced with unambiguous
sexual references which school officials deemed inappropriate for high-school-aged students,
some of whom were freshmen as young as fourteen.152 The district also feared that allowing
Fraser‟s speech to go unpunished would suggest the content of the speech bore the school
administration‟s awareness, if not approval.153 School administrators suspended Fraser for
two days. Fraser brought suit against the school district for violation of his right to free speech
in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington.154 Though testimony
revealed students in the audience reacted noisily and three students responded to Fraser‟s
speech inappropriately,155 the district court did not view the noisy and gesticulating audience
member responses as significant enough reason for school administrators to restrict Fraser‟s
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First Amendment rights by disciplining him.156 Thus, relying upon Tinker, the district court
found in favor of Fraser. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court‟s judgment,
concluding Fraser‟s speech had not caused a “material interference with school activity….”157
In 1986, the Supreme Court reversed the lower court decisions.158 The Court made a
distinction between the school‟s duty to support the student expression of political views
against the school‟s obligation to teach “socially appropriate behavior.”159 In addition, the
Court found the audience responses to Fraser‟s speech harmful.160 The Court found it
significant that in response to Fraser‟s speech, some students were disoriented, confused, and
uncomfortable, others whooped and hollered, and a few pantomimed the sexual activity
Fraser was describing.161 The Court deemed these reactions significant enough to warrant
disciplining Fraser to protect both students and the district‟s reputation by forbidding student
speech which was vulgar, offensive, and not political.162 The Court held the school district
acted within its authority to discipline “Fraser in response to his offensively lewd and
indecent speech.”163 The Court differentiated the facts of this case from those of Tinker,
noting in Tinker students were disciplined for wearing armbands expressing a political
opinion while Fraser‟s “offensively lewd and indecent speech” was “unrelated to any political
viewpoint.”164 Fraser‟s student speech was clearly not school sponsored. The Court pointed
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out that school officials are not barred by the First Amendment to prohibit speech like
Fraser‟s that is “vulgar and lewd.”165 To allow such speech at a school-sponsored event might
suggest that the school district endorses the speech.166 The Court took the stance that though
student political expression, like the relatively peaceful wearing of the armbands in Tinker,
must enjoy First Amendment protection, “a high school assembly or classroom is no place for
a sexually explicit monologue directed towards an unsuspecting audience of teenage
students.”167 Accordingly, the Court found it appropriate for the school district to distance
itself from the appearance of school sponsorship of Fraser‟s speech. The Court opined that the
school district acted appropriately when disciplining Fraser for “vulgar speech and lewd
conduct” that was “wholly inconsistent with the „fundamental values‟ of public school
education.”168
Justice Burger, in writing for the majority, acknowledged the Supreme Court had
acted previously to support the responsibility of a school district to shield children who are “a
captive audience” (like those at a school assembly) from students acting inappropriately and
through their speech exposing an audience (which may include children) to “sexually explicit,
indecent, or lewd speech.”169 The opinion even referenced Justice Black‟s dissent in Tinker,
agreeing with Justice Black‟s dissenting opinion that school officials are not compelled by the
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Constitution to give up efforts to keep order and teach civility and manners in schools by
ceding power to students.170
The Court held the school district was within the bounds of the Constitution by
disciplining Fraser in part because the impetus for the suspension was not motivated by a
disagreement with his political views.171 Thus, the Court did not view Tinker as the
appropriate standard.172 The Court felt Fraser went too far over the border of what school
administrators should allow if they are to be expected to promote “socially appropriate
behavior.”173 So, instead of applying Tinker,174 the Court created a different student speech
test than was used in Tinker175 because the Court recognized that some student speech should
be restricted because of its potential harm to students and its incompatibility with the school
district‟s educational objectives.176 According to Fraser, student speech may be restricted if it
is so vulgar and lewd that it “would undermine the school‟s basic educational mission.”177
Furthermore, the Court noted "the constitutional rights of students in public school are not
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automatically coextensive with the rights of adults in other settings."178 Thus, Fraser gave
school authorities the ability to disassociate the school district from certain forms of student
speech by establishing rules for appropriate student expression that aligned with the school‟s
basic educational mission.179

Hazelwood v. Kuhlmeier (1988)
Two years after the Fraser decision, the Supreme Court in 1988 decided Hazelwood v.
Kuhlmeier,180 the third Supreme Court case dealing with student First Amendment freedom of
speech. In this case, three student members of the Hazelwood High School newspaper staff
brought suit against the Hazelwood School District for violation of their First Amendment
free speech rights. Principal Robert Reynolds removed pages from the final draft of the school
newspaper, Spectrum, which contained articles he deemed inappropriate for publication in a
school-sponsored newspaper.181 One of the articles at issue dealt with the impact of parental
divorce on teenagers at Hazelwood.182 A second article concerned Hazelwood East students‟
experience with teen pregnancy.183 Reynolds regularly reviewed page proofs prior to the
newspaper‟s publication.184 He objected to the pregnancy article because he did not think it
was possible to keep secret the identity of the girls discussed and because the article contained
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references to sexual activity that were not suitable for the younger students.185 Reynolds was
concerned about the divorce story due to comments from one of the named students who
criticized her father‟s behavior leading up to the divorce.186 He felt that an opportunity to
respond should have been given to the student‟s parents or at the very least they should have
given their consent to be included in the article.187 Since the paper had to go to the publisher
in only a couple of days to meet the end-of-year deadline, he was thus faced with a choice:
either eliminate entirely the two pages containing these articles and publish the rest or do not
print the newspaper at all.188 Reynolds chose to delete the two pages and publish the rest.189
The students contended they could publish virtually anything in Spectrum because it was a
venue for student views and opinions.190
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri held that the
school administration‟s concerns about safeguarding the privacy of the pregnant students were
rational and valid.191 The district court tackled the issue of whether Spectrum was a public
forum, enjoying significant First Amendment protection as a place for students to freely
express their views, or whether it was a fundamental part of the school-sponsored
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curriculum.192 The district court observed members of the student newspaper staff were
enrolled in a class taught by a faculty member who regularly exerted final editorial control
over the newspaper and issued grades and course credit for successful course achievement.
Additionally, the bulk of the production work of the newspaper was completed in class,
thereby making Spectrum a school-sponsored part of the curriculum rather than a public
forum open for free student expression.193
Accordingly, the district court concluded Principal Reynolds was justified in his
actions to protect students from being subjected to inappropriate articles in a schoolsponsored newspaper.194 The Hazelwood School Board policy manual emphasized the schoolsponsored nature of student expression multiple times, noting school-sponsored publications
were part of the curriculum and consequently, as long as the pieces were written with sound
journalistic practices and integrity, then the administration could not constrain that free
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expression.195 Finally, the district court decided that though students had been taught
appropriate journalistic practices, they missed several necessary steps related to the writing of
these articles.196 Thus the district court found Principal Reynolds‟ actions reasonable.197
On appeal, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding Spectrum was a
student newspaper in every sense and that Principal Reynolds had interfered with the rights of
students to express their views.198 To support this conclusion, the court pointed to the fact that
students working on the Spectrum staff were given autonomy to select staff members, decide
the topic of articles and direct much of the content of those articles.199 Therefore, the Eighth
Circuit determined Spectrum was a public forum which allowed free expression of student
speech and, as such, school administrators had violated the First Amendment rights of the
students.200 Citing Tinker, the Eighth Circuit determined the only basis on which the articles
could be censored was if school administrators could show they would cause a material and
substantial disruption.201 Thus, the Eighth Circuit would have applied Tinker, and since no
material and substantial disruption occurred, the school district did indeed violate the
students‟ First Amendment free speech rights.202
When the case reached the Supreme Court, the majority disagreed with the Eighth
Circuit‟s reasoning. Justice White, writing for the majority, noted since school facilities were
generally used for the express purpose of educating students, they are not public forums and
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school officials were justified in exercising a level of control over the school-sponsored
publication.203 The Court stressed the school newspaper was an instructional classroom
activity and as such could be reasonably edited by school administrators.204 The Court further
reasoned Principal Reynolds‟ actions, specifically the removing “for pedagogical concerns”
two entire pages of the paper rather than just the two questionable articles, were logical and
did not offend the First Amendment.205 Apparently, the majority believed Tinker was not
strong enough or broad enough to cover the student expression in this case. Since the student
speech could be perceived as being endorsed by the school, then school administrators should
have more authority to control it.206
The Supreme Court‟s reversal created a third judicial First Amendment student speech
test by deciding that if educators have “legitimate pedagogical concerns” about student speech
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which is linked to the curriculum, then they may curtail that student speech without violating
the First Amendment.207 The Court determined the Tinker standard, though applicable “for
determining when a school may punish student expression,” was not necessarily the
appropriate “standard for determining when a school may refuse to lend its name and
resources to the dissemination of student expression.”208 Thus, the Hazelwood test allows
school administrators to prohibit student speech which is associated with a school-sponsored
activity as long “as their actions are reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns.”209

Morse v. Frederick (2007)
The fourth and most recent student free speech case, decided by the Supreme Court in
2007, was Morse v. Frederick.210 Joseph Frederick, a high school student, brought suit against
Juneau-Douglas High School (JDHS) Principal Deborah Morse and the school for violating
his First Amendment rights to free speech.211 In January, 2002, the Olympic Torch Relay was
scheduled to pass by Frederick‟s school during the school day.212 Principal Morse approved a
school event which allowed students the opportunity to observe the torch relay by leaving
class and standing on either side of the street across from the school to watch the relay while
staff supervised.213 Joseph Frederick was late to school that day.214 Immediately upon his
arrival, he went straight to his friends who were positioned directly across the street from the
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school.215 As media crews with cameras and the torchbearers passed by Frederick‟s location,
he and his friends unfurled a banner which read "BONG HiTS 4 JESUS."216 The banner had
large letters which made the phrase clearly readable by anyone on the opposite side of the
street.217 As soon as she saw the banner, Principal Morse, judging the banner promoted illegal
drug use, crossed the street and ordered the banner taken down.218 All students obeyed except
Frederick.219 In response, Principal Morse commandeered the banner and suspended
Frederick for ten days, prompting Frederick to file suit.220
During arguments in 2003 before the United States District Court for the District of
Alaska, both sides agreed that determining if the parade-viewing event was school sponsored
was a fundamental question which the district court needed to address.221 The school district
contended the student viewing of the torch relay was a school-sponsored activity.222 Principal
Morse asserted she approved of teachers taking students to view the torch relay because she
thought the experience had educational significance.223 Frederick, on the other hand,
contested Morse‟s claim that the event was school sponsored.224 In addition, Frederick
maintained he had First Amendment free speech rights to display the banner.225 Finally,
Frederick argued since he was not at school at the beginning of the day, the school

215

Id.
Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 397 (2007).
217
Id.
218
Id. at 398.
219
Id.
220
Id. at 396, 399.
221
Frederick v. Morse, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27270, 16 (D. Alaska 2003).
222
Id. at 17.
223
Id. at 16.
224
Id.
225
Id.
216

37
administration could not consider him a participant in the event, even if the court determined
it to be school sponsored.226
The district court found for Principal Morse and the school district, saying Morse
acted reasonably in disciplining Frederick because the banner‟s BONG HiTS 4 JESUS
message clearly violated the school board‟s stated objectives associated with its drug abuse
prevention programs and was wholly inconsistent with the school district‟s efforts to
discourage illegal drug use.227 In addition, the district court noted it was common sense to
consider the event school sponsored since it took place during school hours, the band and
cheerleaders were mobilized to hail the relay participants, and teachers and administrators
supervised students.228 The district court gave this school-sponsored distinction considerable
weight, stating the extent of the school administration‟s power to control the student
expression was grounded in Fraser and Fraser’s reach was broad enough to allow Principal
Morse to discipline Frederick for his speech advocating drug use so that the school district
would not be viewed as sanctioning such a message.229 Morse‟s belief that she had the right
and obligation to discipline Frederick for his speech promoting drug use was reasonable,
according to the district court, not only because of the Supreme Court ruling in Fraser but
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also the school board‟s policies forbidding such expression.230 Conversely, Frederick argued
that Tinker clearly established his First Amendment rights and thus it stood to bar the school
district from disciplining him for his speech.231 The district court rejected this argument,
ruling Tinker was inapplicable because “the expression in Tinker did not intrude upon the
work of the schools.”232
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed.233 The Ninth Circuit opined that Tinker,
rather than Fraser, should be the controlling case in this instance.234 In citing Tinker, the court
reasoned since the school district did not provide sufficient evidence of a substantial
disruption, Principal Morse and the school board violated Frederick‟s First Amendment
speech rights by disciplining him for displaying the banner.235
The Supreme Court agreed to review the case to determine if Frederick really did have
a First Amendment right to exhibit the banner, which he claimed was meant to be
humorous.236 Principal Morse maintained the banner served to promote the use of illegal
drugs “in violation of established school policy.”237 The Court denied Frederick‟s allegation
that the event was not school sponsored, noting Principal Morse approved the event which
took place during the school day.238 Complicating the issue further was the fact that Frederick
was late to school that day and instead of checking in when he did arrive, Frederick went
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straight to where his JDHS friends were assembled across the street from the school.239
Frederick claimed because he was across the street from the school, he thus was not at school
and consequently Principal Morse had no authority to discipline him.240
The Court disagreed with Frederick‟s claims, noting the event fell under the school
district rules for an approved, school-sponsored class trip or event.241 A number of factors
played a role in defining the event as school sponsored. First, the event took place during
normal school hours just outside of the school building.242 Second, teachers and
administrators were there to supervise.243 Third, the cheerleaders and band performed while
students lined the streets.244 The Court sided with the school district in its assertion that
“Frederick cannot stand in the midst of his fellow students, during school hours, at a schoolsanctioned activity and claim he is not at school.”245 Thus, the event was judged by the
Supreme Court to be a school-sponsored student speech case.246
The Supreme Court discussed its previous three student speech cases, namely Tinker,
Fraser, and Hazelwood, and their application to Morse. The school district sought to have the
Court apply Fraser to the Morse case by deeming the words on Frederick‟s banner “plainly
offensive.”247 Morse and the school district did not claim that Frederick‟s banner caused a
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disruption. Thus the school district thought Fraser applicable since that decision was not
grounded on the school district proving a substantial disruption.248 However, the Court
determined this would stretch Fraser too far.249 The Court pointed out that Fraser does not
serve to regulate any expression which someone might find offensive. Most religious and
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political speech could fall into the category of offending someone. 250 The Court opined that if
Fraser had delivered the same speech in a public place disconnected in every way from the
school, then it would have enjoyed protection.251 Thus, the Court sought to narrowly interpret
the Morse decision as constitutional protection for school officials who discipline students for
their speech which endorses the use of illegal drugs.252
The Court also found Hazelwood did not control because “no one would reasonably
believe that Frederick's banner bore the school's imprimatur.”253 However, the Court found
Hazelwood important to the analysis of the Morse case for two reasons. First, Hazelwood
established the principle that schools may regulate some speech "even though the government
could not censor similar speech outside the school."254 Additionally, Hazelwood supported the
notion “that the rule of Tinker is not the only basis for restricting student speech.”255 Finally,
in discussing Tinker, the Court reasoned allowing a pro-drug message displayed on a banner
at a school-sponsored event to be far more dangerous than the armbands in Tinker.256 The
Court found it reasonable for Principal Morse to deem the banner with the words “Bong Hits
for Jesus” as promoting the use of illegal drugs.257 In addition, the Supreme Court, like the
district court, determined “that failing to act would send a powerful message to the students in
her [Morse‟s] charge, including Frederick, about how serious the school was about the
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dangers of illegal drug use.”258 Furthermore, the Court maintained school officials overtly
fighting against student drug use was a “compelling interest.”259
Justice Alito, in a concurring opinion, outlined his view by cautioning that the reach of
the Morse opinion can go no further than restricting student speech promoting drug use.260
However, Justice Alito did not stop there; he added much more. He opined that the Morse
opinion should not inhibit students from “commenting on any political or social issue.”261 He
cautioned anyone from interpreting the Morse opinion to mean “that the First Amendment
permits public schools, which are „organs of the state,‟ to censor any student speech that
interferes with the school‟s „educational mission.‟”262 He said that the Court‟s Morse opinion
should not be construed to support the school district‟s argument that school officials can
suppress “any student speech that interferes with a school‟s „educational mission.‟”263 He
warned that supporting such a position would be hazardous because it would permit public
schools to push political and social agendas onto students and allow discipline for those who
did not concur.264 In addition, Justice Alito suggested the educational mission of public
schools should be created by school boards and school administrators.265 Justice Alito asserted
that limiting students‟ First Amendment free speech protections should “be based on some
special characteristic of the school setting.”266 In the school setting, said Justice Alito, school
258
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officials should have broader power to take measures to prevent student speech from leading
to violence.267 In this case, Justice Alito deemed speech promoting the use of illegal drugs as
dangerous for students and concluded public schools may prohibit speech advocating illegal
drug use.268 However, he wrote that such control exists at the periphery of the Court‟s power
to do so.269
The majority opinion boiled the case down to the central question of whether a school
administrator, at a school-sponsored activity, can suppress student speech that a reasonable
administrator would believe endorsed the use of illegal drugs.270 The Court opined a school
administrator can indeed forbid such speech.271 Thus, the Court determined Principal Morse
and the school district were within their authority to discipline Frederick in order to send a
powerful message about the ills of illegal drug use and to show that the First Amendment did
not demand schools allow student speech which promotes dangerous behavior.272
Consequently, the Court created yet another student speech standard: schools have broad
authority to regulate in-school student speech which endorses the use of illegal drugs.273
The four Supreme Court cases described above provide four tests for courts to use
when deciding student free speech cases. The first test, from Tinker, seeks to determine if the
student-sponsored speech in question causes or reasonably could cause a substantial
disruption to the educational environment or if the student speech infringes upon the rights of
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others.274 The second test, from Fraser, deals with determining if the student speech is
associated with a school-sponsored activity275 and looks at the impact of the content of the
student expression (for example, its level of lewdness and vulgarity).276 From Hazelwood, the
third test addresses if the student speech could be construed as school sponsored.277 If the
speech bears the school‟s imprimatur, then Hazelwood allows school administrators to censor
that student speech as long “as their actions are reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical
concerns.”278 The fourth test, found in Morse, establishes that school officials can prohibit at
school events student speech that advocates the use of illegal drugs.279
Tinker and the subsequent three Supreme Court student speech cases all deal with
speech that occurred at school. In Tinker, the Court stated, “…students [do not] shed their
constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate.”280 However,
neither Tinker nor the other three decisions addressed student speech occurring away from
school. Further, cyberspeech which occurs away from school grounds can have a nexus281 to
the school environment and negatively affect the school day. Again, the four Supreme Court
student speech cases do not address this issue. Moreover, what about student speech occurring
away from school which is accessible at school via computer? Also, how should school
administrators handle student speech originating away from school yet still ending up within
the metes and bounds of the schoolhouse gate? Over four decades after Tinker, with the
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internet and cell-connected devices like Android phones making communication readily
available within the school setting, some scholars assert the Tinker Court could not have
conceived of the concept of student cyberspeech.282
In each of the Supreme Court student free speech cases, the Court has indicated that
within the school setting, students‟ right to free speech is more limited than in other
environments.283 However, student cyberspeech is very different from the examples portrayed
in those four Supreme Court student speech benchmark cases, making the administrative
decisions regarding student cyberspeech more difficult. Though a Supreme Court cyberspeech
opinion would be helpful, in its absence, courts must apply non-cyberspeech case law to
cyberspeech fact patterns.284
Though the Supreme Court has spoken about the protections afforded internet
expression, the special circumstances of the school environment285 provide many nuances to
student expression disseminated via the internet. For instance, some scholars contend school
administrators will not be successful in court if they punish students for internet speech which
is simply offensive towards or critical of school personnel.286 However, those same scholars
claim if a student posts internet expression which either law enforcement authorities or school
officials define as credibly threatening speech, or speech that is directly tied to a subsequent
on-campus disturbance, then administrators are likely to prevail against a court challenge.287
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Though the Supreme Court student speech cases did not directly address cyberspeech, those
four cases provide the only current guidance for lower courts and school administrators to use
in making decisions regarding incidents of student off-campus cyberspeech. Some scholars
argue Tinker should only be the referent case in dealing with off-campus internet speech if the
student deliberately brings the speech onto campus to make a display which may lead to a
foreseeable disruption.288

Review of Current Student Speech Cases and Decisions
There have been multiple lower court cases with facts describing student expression
which served to bully, harass, disparage, or otherwise inappropriately attack students, faculty,
and even parents. These lower court decisions, in concert with the four Supreme Court student
speech cases described above, provide guidelines for other lower courts and school
administrators when faced with decisions regarding student speech incidents. The lower court
cases discussed in the remainder of this paper do not all involve cyberspeech incidents.
However, they are the referent cases in the area of student expression targeting staff members.
Moreover, this study is delimited to an examination of cases involving student off-campus
speech targeting school staff members. The cases are presented in chronological order by the
date of the decision. They represent an array of issues involving student expression pertinent
to providing guidance to courts and school administrators who need to make decisions
regarding off-campus student cyberspeech which targets school staff members.
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Thomas v. Board of Education, Granville School District (1979)
An early non-Supreme Court case which featured student speech targeting school staff
members and numerous other topics actually was decided even before the Supreme Court
heard Fraser. In 1979, the Second Circuit ruled in Thomas v. Board of Education, Granville
School District.289 The case dealt with students who created, for the most part off school
grounds, a satirical newspaper titled Hard Times, which poked fun at a number of things at
the school, like cheerleaders, school lunches, and staff members.290 The front page made clear
the intent of the newspaper‟s content with a banner boasting, “Uncensored -- Vulgar –
Immoral!!!”291 One article included an editorial about masturbation.292 The newspaper
contained other articles with similar content.293
The students who conceived of the idea for Hard Times held brainstorming sessions at
school during their after-school study time. Though most of the work for the publication was
conducted off school grounds, part of it was done at school.294 Furthermore, once the first
edition was printed, it was stored in a closet located in a teacher‟s classroom, with the
teacher‟s permission.295 The teacher admitted allowing the newspapers to be stored in his
classroom might have made him “guilty of poor judgment.”296 In addition, the teacher
testified he recommended to students that they sell Hard Times off school grounds.297
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Students sold copies of Hard Times at a local store.298 Evidence indicated the students took
great care to print and distribute the newspaper off school property.299 Even though Hard
Times was largely produced and distributed off-campus, upon discovering the newspaper‟s
existence, school officials suspended the students from school, segregated them from other
students during study hall,300 and revoked all of the students‟ senior privileges.301 These
disciplinary measures prompted suit by the students who sought an injunction in the United
States District Court for the Northern District of New York to allow them to return to school,
claiming their First Amendment right to free speech had been violated.302
The district court referenced Tinker in its decision denying the students‟ motion for
injunctive relief. The court noted the evidence showed Hard Times posed a threat to
administrators‟ efforts to keep adequate control of Granville Junior High School.303
Consequently, the district court held Tinker controlled the decision.304 Thus, the district court
determined the student speech expressed in Hard Times did not enjoy First Amendment
protection.305
On appeal, the Second Circuit sided with the students and overturned the district court
ruling. The case was remanded to the district court for further proceedings.306 The Second
Circuit panel opined that school administrators were meddling in student speech that was not
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within their purview.307 The Second Circuit took the stance that though school officials are
responsible for student speech which is expressed at school,308 they are not allowed by the
First Amendment to prohibit what students read or say when they are away from school. 309
The court reluctantly recognized that there were certain types of speech which school
administrators were constitutionally permitted to prohibit. However, it limited these
prohibitions to speech which occurred on-campus by saying school administrators‟ power is
confined to “the metes and bounds of the school itself.”310 The Second Circuit could not find
evidence that Hard Times caused any disruption at school, as Tinker required if administration
seeks to prohibit student speech.311 Though the Second Circuit determined Hard Times to be
off-campus expression and thus beyond the reach of school officials‟ authority, Judge
Newman, in a concurring opinion for the Thomas court, alluded to the verity that determining
the reach of school officials may not be as simple as limiting it to within the walls of the
school.312
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Klein v. Smith (1986)
In the 1986 District Court of Maine student speech case Klein v. Smith,313 a student,
Jason Klein, sought an injunction prohibiting Oxford Hills High School officials from
suspending him for directing an offensive hand gesture (an extended middle finger) toward a
teacher while in a parking lot at a restaurant outside of school hours.314 Though not directly a
student cyberspeech case, the issue of whether any real nexus exists to inappropriate offcampus student behavior directed at a staff member is prominent in Klein.315
The case involved a teacher, Clyde Clark, who was in his car, waiting on his son, in a
restaurant parking lot when Klein pulled up as a passenger in another car and extended the
middle finger of one hand toward Clark.316 In response, school officials suspended Klein for
ten days, citing a school rule that called for students to be disciplined for crude or offensive
conduct aimed at a staff member.317 The school district claimed ignoring Klein‟s behavior
would lead to a weakening of the staff‟s ability to maintain order in the school.318 However,
the United States District Court for the District of Maine eschewed the argument, asserting
school staff members are far more influential than any webpage could ever be.319 Some
scholars believe school officials must take advantage of such a teachable moment, like in
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Klein, when student cyberspeech aimed at other students or school staff members conflicts
with acceptable school values.320
The district court determined the student‟s off-campus gesture was indeed made with
intent to show his contempt for Clark. However, the court observed that at the time of the
incident, Clark was not performing any functions as a teacher, Klein was not performing any
functions as a student, and the restaurant was not on school grounds nor was there a school
function occurring there.321 Klein, then, was not acting in the capacity of a student but as a
non-student or community citizen, enjoying the same free speech rights as an adult. As such,
the court found his speech was beyond the reach of school authority.322 Furthermore, the court
believed Klein‟s gesture was unlikely to incite any sort of disruption at school nor was it
likely to illicit an aggressive reaction from Clark.323 Though the court recognized Klein‟s act
was boorish,324 it determined nonetheless the school district infringed upon Klein‟s First
Amendment speech rights when it suspended him for communication that was protected.325
The school district did not appeal.

Beussink v. Woodland (1998)
Twelve years later, in 1998, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Missouri heard Beussink v. Woodland,326 a case involving Brandon Beussink, a Woodland
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High School student, who created a webpage at home and made it available to anyone
conducting a simple internet search.327 The webpage included sharp and crude criticism of a
number of Woodland High School staff members and school procedures, including the
administration, teaching staff, and the school‟s website.328 Beussink also encouraged website
visitors to share their opinions about Woodland by reaching out to the principal to give their
opinions about Woodland.329 In addition, Beussink‟s website included a hyperlink to
Woodland High School‟s website.330 A friend of Beussink‟s who had knowledge of the
website accessed it at school and showed it to a teacher.331 Beussink testified he never meant
for anyone to view the webpage at Woodland High School.332 Even though Beussink himself
did not open the website at school, Principal Yancy Poorman suspended him anyway for ten
days because Poorman was upset the website, with its crude language, was displayed on
computer screens in classrooms.333 As a result, Beussink brought suit against the school
district for violation of his First Amendment free speech rights.
In finding for Beussink, the district court noted the school district violated his First
Amendment rights in a number of ways. First, the court determined Principal Poorman‟s
decision to suspend Beussink was not founded in any concrete legal standard, but rather in his
disdain for the substance of the words Beussink chose to include in the website.334 The district
court made its decision based on Tinker, writing that “disliking or being upset by the content
327
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of a student‟s speech is not an acceptable justification for limiting student speech under
Tinker.”335 Tinker requires either a reasonable fear that a substantial disruption will occur or
actual incidence of disruption in order to sustain discipline for student speech under the First
Amendment.336 The court additionally applied Tinker in observing “Individual student speech
which is unpopular but does not substantially interfere with school discipline is entitled to
protection.”337 Testimony indicated that although several students viewed Beussink‟s
webpage, no noteworthy disruptions occurred at school.338 Principal Poorman testified the
only incidents resembling a disruption were students discussing the webpage in the halls.339
Thus, the court granted Beussink‟s request for injunction, ordered the Woodland
School District to erase Beussink‟s suspension, prohibited the school district from imposing
any other discipline related to Beussink‟s webpage, and denied the school district the right to
constrain Beussink from using his home computer to repost the contents of the webpage.340
The case was not appealed.

Emmett v. Kent (2000)
Two years later, in 2000, the United States District Court for the Western District of
Washington heard Emmett v. Kent.341 The case involved a challenge to a school district
decision to expel Kentlake High School senior Nick Emmett (“Nick”), who created a
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webpage at home.342 The webpage included Nick‟s musings about employees at Kentlake and
also featured mock obituaries of Kentlake students who were Nick‟s friends.343 The obituaries
were inspired by a creative writing class assignment which required students to write their
own obituary.344 Nick stretched the assignment by accepting online votes for who should be
the next student to “die”- that is, become the next obituary featured on his website.345 The
media found out about the website and a television news story was broadcast, describing
Nick‟s website as containing a hit list of people to be killed.346
Upon learning of the existence of the website, school officials expelled Nick for
“intimidation, harassment, and disruption to the educational process.”347 School officials
argued the expulsion was justified because websites like Nick‟s could serve as a warning that
the student had violent tendencies.348 In addition, the school district asserted the website
should be taken seriously in light of the recent school shootings in other locations that had
taken place around the time of Nick‟s webpage postings.349 However, after further
investigation, school officials determined a threat was not imminent and the expulsion was
reduced to a five-day suspension.350
Nick and his family brought to the district court a motion for a temporary restraining
order barring the school district from imposing the suspension.351 Referring to Tinker, the
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court granted the temporary restraining order, noting there was no disruption of the
educational process connected to the website.352 Additionally, it found that the website
contents, including the mock obituaries, did not constitute a threat to anyone.353 The court also
discussed the application of Fraser and Hazelwood to this case but determined they did not
apply in this instance because Nick‟s speech could not have been confused with speech
endorsed by the school. In order for Fraser to control, Nick‟s expression would have had to
have taken place at school, in front of a captive audience. For Hazelwood to control, his
expression would have had to have been printed in a school-sponsored publication. Neither of
these school-sponsored scenarios occurred in this case.354 Nick created the website away from
school and did not use any school time or resources in designing it.355 Thus, since Nick‟s
expression took place at home after school hours, the court surmised it was beyond the
jurisdiction of school administrators and granted the restraining order.356 There was no appeal.

Killion v. Franklin (2001)
Just a year after the Emmett decision, in 2001, the United States District Court for the
Western District of Pennsylvania ruled on Killion v. Franklin Regional School District.357
The case involved Zachariah Paul, a student at Franklin Regional High School, who was upset
about school administrators denying him a student parking permit. The case details are not
specific, but apparently the permit denial was connected to some school rules being imposed
352
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on the track team, of which Paul was a member.358 To vent his frustration, Paul, using his
home computer outside of school hours, created a “Top Ten” list referring to athletic director
Robert Buzzuto and his appearance in unflattering terms.359 The list featured disparaging
remarks about Buzzuto‟s body type and private body parts.360 Paul emailed the list to multiple
friends.361 Though Paul did not print, copy, or otherwise bring the list to school, some weeks
later, hard copies of the Top Ten list appeared in the Franklin Regional High School and
Middle School.362 School administrators interviewed Paul, who admitted creating the list but
denied bringing it to school.363 School administrators suspended Paul for ten days because the
list included insulting comments about a school official and had made its way to school.364
Both sides sought summary judgment.365 Paul claimed his First Amendment rights
were violated because he was disciplined for expression he created at home, off school
grounds, thus rendering the Supreme Court student speech jurisprudence irrelevant, regardless
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of its content.366 On the other hand, the school district asserted the speech was disruptive,
lewd, and obscene, and the suspension was therefore justified by Tinker and Fraser.367
The district court addressed the fact that the student cyberspeech had originated off
school property and noted the Supreme Court student speech decisions involved expression
occurring on school grounds.368 The court alluded to other lower court decisions in which
Tinker had been used to make decisions regarding student expression created off-campus and
conveyed to school grounds by someone other than the creator.369 The district court observed
most courts had applied Tinker to student speech cases, regardless of whether the expression
was created on- or off-campus.370 Since Paul‟s speech had made its way onto school property,
the court determined Tinker to be the appropriate analytical tool.371 Applying Tinker, the court
concluded school officials had violated Paul‟s First Amendment rights because no evidence of
disruption was produced.372
Thus, the Killion court concluded simply finding the contents of the Top Ten list
distasteful, without a substantial disruption or serious threat of one, was not sufficient
justification for school administrators to discipline Paul.373 Additionally, the court considered
whether Fraser applied since school officials contended Paul‟s expression was “lewd and
366
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obscene” and therefore punishable under Fraser.”374 The court relied on other courts‟ findings
that the power school officials possess to control student off-campus expression is far more
limited when compared to student expression occurring on-campus.375 The court noted that
Paul‟s speech did not occur at a school-sponsored assembly nor was it printed in a schoolsponsored publication. Consequently, neither Fraser nor Hazelwood were controlling. The
court deemed the speech “entirely outside of the school‟s supervision or control.”376
The court reasoned the facts of this case were more akin to those in Klein v. Smith and
Thomas v. Board of Education.377 That is, the speech was created at home, disconnected from
any school purpose, and thus Fraser was inapplicable.378 On a final note, the court
commented that Paul‟s list, though boorish and embarrassing to Bozzuto, did not constitute a
real threat nor did it cause Bozzuto to need a leave of absence, as had occurred in other
cases.379 Consequently, the court found the discipline to be in violation of Paul‟s First
Amendment rights and granted him summary judgment.380 The case was not appealed.

J.S. v. Bethlehem (2002)
Most of the cases in this study are federal cases. However, J.S. v. Bethlehem, a
Pennsylvania state case from 2002, is included because it is the one state case found which
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dealt specifically with student cyberspeech targeting school staff members.381 In this case, the
court wrestled with the issue of whether the First Amendment allowed Bethlehem school
officials to impose discipline on J.S., a student, for his actions away from school which
entailed his posting of a website that “contained derogatory, profane, offensive and
threatening statements” aimed at a teacher and the principal.382 In response to the webpage,
J.S. was suspended for what school officials alleged were violations of school policy and the
Code of Conduct, including statements considered threatening, harassing, and disrespecting to
school staff members.383 J.S. brought suit, alleging the suspension for conduct occurring away
from school was a violation of his First Amendment rights.384
The speech in question in this case was multiple webpages J.S. created titled Teacher
Sux. The pages included content targeting one of his teachers, Mrs. Fulmer.385 They listed
reasons she should be killed and requested readers to contribute money for a hitman.386
Another page contained profanity directed at her and yet another featured a bloody illustration
of a beheaded Mrs. Fulmer.387 Evidence presented before the court revealed Mrs. Fulmer was
so terrified by the webpage that she had to go under the care of a doctor, was rendered
incapable of venturing out-of-doors, and could not return to school.388 In 2000, the
Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court recognized that school violence is now often
381
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commonplace.389 The court believed school officials should take seriously student expression
which could reasonably be viewed as a threat.390 The court found the content of the website
and its effect on Mrs. Fulmer to disqualify J.S.‟s speech from First Amendment protection.391
J.S. appealed to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court acknowledged the internet certainly muddled the
extent of students‟ First Amendment free speech rights.392 The court also established that just
because student speech occurs away from the school setting does not mean it is exempt from
disciplinary action taken by school administrators.393 The court discovered the school
community became aware of the webpage at least in part because J.S. publicized its existence
by accessing it while at school and showing it to other students.394 The court acknowledged
Mrs. Fulmer experienced harm and school officials were reasonable in taking potential threats
seriously in light of recent violent episodes in schools.395 However, the court expressed that
offensive student speech is not necessarily a true threat just because it is loathsome.396 As a
result, the court found J.S.‟s speech did not constitute a true threat.397 With that issue set
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aside, the court considered if school officials acted within the parameters of the First
Amendment when they disciplined J.S. for his webpage.398
The court applied both Tinker and Fraser to make its ruling. In upholding the lower
court‟s decision that the school district did not violate the First Amendment rights of J.S., the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court noted the United States Constitution allowed the State to
prohibit some forms of student speech, especially speech occurring at school.399 And the
website was accessed at school.400 The opinion also referred to an earlier Pennsylvania
Commonwealth Court decision401 which referenced other cases where disciplinary actions
against students for their actions away from school had been upheld.402 Justice Cappy, in
writing the Bethlehem opinion for the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, wrote even though J.S.
created the website away from school, it became on-campus speech when he opened it at
school. Thus, the court surmised Tinker was the controlling test.403 As a result, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court described several reasons for its decision to uphold the lower
court‟s finding that the school district did not violate J.S.‟s First Amendment rights by
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disciplining him for his cyberspeech. First, J.S. communicated to other students that he had
created the website and thus it was a foregone conclusion the website and its contents would
become common knowledge among students and staff.404 Furthermore, even though the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court recognized other courts had referred to Tinker when deciding on
cases of “internet communication,” it was “not convinced that reliance solely on Tinker was
appropriate.”405 Thus, in making its decision, the court focused on both the disruption the
website caused (actionable under Tinker) and the effect the lewd, vulgar, and plainly offensive
webpage content had on individuals at school (actionable under Fraser).406
The court disagreed with J.S.‟s contention that any disruption which occurred was so
minor that it did not even qualify as substantial under Tinker’s definition.407 The court pointed
to specific examples of disruption. First, Mrs. Fulmer was absent for over three school weeks,
causing the school district to utilize three substitute teachers and thereby disrupting the
education of students.408 Second, testimony revealed students experienced feelings of
“helplessness and low morale…an atmosphere as if a student had died.”409 A third example of
disruption was parents communicating apprehension over the length of time substitutes would
be taking over classes and how this might negatively affect learning.410 Consequently, the
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Pennsylvania Supreme Court found “an actual and substantial interference with the work of
the school to a magnitude that satisfied the requirements of Tinker” as a result of J.S.‟s
website.411 Accordingly, J.S.‟s First Amendment rights were not violated when he was
disciplined.412

Flaherty v. Keystone (2003)
Just five months after the Bethlehem decision, in 2003, the U.S. District Court for the
Western District of Pennsylvania ruled on Flaherty v. Keystone Oaks School District.413 In
that case, Keystone Oaks High School (KOHS) student Jack Flaherty, Jr., posted speech to a
website from both his home and from school. Some of the posts contained disparaging
comments about an upcoming volleyball opponent and about a KOHS teacher.414 Upon
discovering the existence of the public posts, school officials disciplined Flaherty in
accordance with the KOSD Student Handbook. Flaherty filed suit, alleging violation of his
First Amendment rights in regard to his discipline and also alleging that portions of the
language found in the Keystone Oaks School District's Student Handbook violated the U.S.
Constitution.415 Flaherty contended the handbook policies were ambiguous and too
encompassing because they forbade expression that should enjoy constitutional protection. 416
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The district court agreed with Flaherty, asserting KOHS Principal Scott Hagy could
not show a substantial disruption had occurred.417 Additionally, the court determined the
sections of the student handbook which school officials referenced in punishing Flaherty were
indeed vague and too broad and lent themselves to indiscriminate application.418 Thus, the
court found the punishment was a violation of the First Amendment and also found the KOHS
Student Handbook unconstitutional because it failed to include geographic boundaries school
administrators should observe when curtailing student expression.419 The court reasoned the
handbook language gave school officials virtually “unrestricted power.”420 Specifically, the
court asserted it was a constitutional violation for school officials “to discipline a student for
… expression occurring outside of school premises and [was] not tied to a school-related
activity.”421 The district court granted Flaherty‟s motion for summary judgment.422 There was
not an appeal.

Porter v. Ascension Parish (2004)
Nearly two years after the Flaherty decision, in 2004, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit decided Porter v. Ascension Parish School Board.423 In that case,
Adam Porter, a student at East Ascension High School in Louisiana, created a drawing at
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home of his school being attacked.424 The drawing portrayed a well-armed military attacking
the school and contained images of a brick being thrown at the school principal.425 After
creating the drawing, Adam tucked the sketchpad away in a closet at home.426 Two years
later, Adam‟s younger brother pulled out the sketchpad to use on a school project.427 After
drawing his project picture, the brother took the pad to his middle school to show his teacher,
and while on the bus trip home, another student noticed the two-year-old sketch Adam had
drawn, showed it to the bus driver, and announced that someone was going to blow up the
school.428 Middle school administrators suspended Adam‟s younger brother for having the
drawing at school and sent the two-year-old drawing to the EAHS principal.429 Alarmed by
the sketch, EAHS administrators found reason to search Adam‟s book bag, discovering a box
cutter and writings describing “death, drugs, sex, depictions of gang symbols, and a fake
ID.”430 The administrators recommended Adam for expulsion and law enforcement arrested
him on charges of “terrorizing EAHS and carrying an illegal weapon.”431 Adam filed suit
against the school district, alleging that his First, Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment
rights had been violated.432
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The U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana quickly dismissed,
without objection, the claims against the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, leaving the
court to determine the merits of a case in violation of the First and Fourth Amendments.433
After consideration, the district court determined that a reasonable school administrator, upon
discovering a drawing like Adam‟s, would be justified in searching a student‟s belongings and
seizing inappropriate materials.434 Thus, the district court dismissed the Fourth Amendment
claim as well.435
In response to the First Amendment claim, school officials asked the district court for
summary judgment in its favor, which was granted.436 The district court used the Tinker
standard in making its determination, finding Adam‟s two-year-old drawings were not
political expression and also constituted a material and substantial interference with
“appropriate discipline in the operation of” the school.437 Additionally, the district court
considered whether the speech qualified as a “true threat.”438 Even though Adam had no
knowledge that his younger brother brought the sketchpad to school and he apparently had no
intention for the drawings to reach the school campus, given the nature of the drawings and
associated language, the court found it reasonable for school officials to regard Adam‟s
drawings as a true threat. School officials and the court referred repeatedly to the danger of
the drawings and did not mention the items discovered in Adam‟s backpack during the search.
Eventually though, the court did point out that the discovery of the box cutter in Adam‟s
433
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possession served to bolster school officials‟ position that they took appropriate disciplinary
action.439 Thus the court ruled in favor of the school district by determining the discipline was
warranted because the drawings did not enjoy First Amendment protection.440
The Fifth Circuit disagreed. The appellate court reasoned since Adam did not
deliberately convey any intention to harm anyone, the drawings could not be deemed a true
threat.441 In addition, the Fifth Circuit suggested because Adam‟s drawing was created offcampus and he had no intention to bring it to campus, it should be protected by the First
Amendment.442 However, because the drawing did eventually appear at school, the Fifth
Circuit wrestled with this issue. As such, the court pondered if perhaps it should be considered
on-campus expression.443 As a result, even though the Fifth Circuit believed the district court
was wrong in finding that there was no violation of Porter‟s First Amendment rights, it upheld
the district court‟s decision based upon a finding that the principal‟s actions had been
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reasonable under the circumstances.444 The Supreme Court denied a subsequent petition for a
writ of certiorari.445

Wisniewski v. Board of Education (2007)
Two and a half years after the Porter v. Ascension Parish decision, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in 2007, decided Wisniewski v. Board of Education
of the Weedsport Central School District.446 Aaron Wisniewski, an eighth-grade student at
Weedsport Middle School in upstate New York, used the computer at his parents‟ home to
create an AOL Instant Messaging (IM) icon of a gun shooting at a person‟s head causing
blood splatters.447 The accompanying caption said, “Kill Mr. VanderMolen,” who was one of
Aaron‟s teachers at the time.448 Aaron sent multiple IM messages which featured this icon to
about fifteen of his friends over a period of approximately three weeks.449 Eventually, another
student gave Mr. VanderMolen a printout of the icon, which greatly upset him.450 Upon
confirming it was Aaron‟s icon and that he had sent it to multiple people, school officials
suspended Aaron for five days.451 A subsequent hearing was convened before a hearing
officer, who found the icon to be a threat and a disruption to the educational process and
recommended a one-semester suspension.452 School officials acted on that recommendation

444

Id. at 625.
Porter v. Ascension Parish School Board, 544 U.S. 1062 (2005).
446
Wisniewski v. Board of Education of the Weedsport Central School District, 494 F. 3d 34 (2nd Cir. 2007).
447
Id. at 36.
448
Id.
449
Id.
450
Id.
451
Id.
452
Id. at 36-37.
445

69
and suspended Aaron for an entire semester.453 The suspension prompted Aaron‟s parents to
file suit, claiming Aaron‟s First Amendment rights were violated.454
The District Court for the Northern District of New York rejected Aaron‟s arguments
and sided with the school district.455 On appeal, citing Tinker, the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals upheld the district court ruling, concluding Aaron‟s icon caused a reasonably
foreseeable disruption to the educational process.456 The Second Circuit believed that
discipline was warranted because Aaron‟s icon went beyond what represented his political
opinion and ventured into unprotected, school-disrupting speech.457 Aaron had asserted the
school discipline violated his First Amendment rights because he did not send the icon to Mr.
VanderMolen or to any other school official,458 and he created the icon at home on his
parents‟ computer, not at school.459 The district court disagreed and the Second Circuit
affirmed that under not only Tinker, but also Thomas, Boucher,460 and Bethlehem, school
officials have authority to discipline for student off-campus conduct which can lead to
substantial disruption at school.461 In those cases, the court upheld discipline for off-campus
expression that produced a foreseeable risk of substantial disruption at school.462 In addition,
the court determined it was reasonably foreseeable that Aaron‟s icon would at some point
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become known to school staff members, including its target, Mr. VanderMolen.463 After the
icon became common knowledge, the court thought the risk of a substantial school disruption
was evident.464 As a result, the court determined that school discipline for Aaron‟s posts was
permissible.465
Some scholars find it interesting that the Second Circuit did not deem Aaron‟s icon a
true threat yet upheld the district‟s right to levy discipline anyway under Tinker’s substantial
disruption clause.466 Those same scholars believe the court‟s decision in Wisniewski supports
school administrators who act to protect students and staff by eschewing the notion that any
damage caused by online expression must be tolerated in order to protect the free speech
rights of the online poster.467 On the other hand, other scholars summarize Wisniewski as a
license for school administrators to suppress student off-campus speech if they believe that it
might somehow come onto school grounds.468 This analysis stems from the court‟s
determination that it was reasonably foreseeable that school officials and the targeted teacher
would discover the icon.469 Because the court deemed the icon threatening and widespread,
then the court found the possibility of school disruption to be “foreseeable to a reasonable
person, if not inevitable.”470 The fear of some scholars is that the Wisniewski decision allows
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school administrators to stretch their disciplinary reach far beyond the school realm without
any restraints.471

O.Z. v. Board of Trustees (2008)
A year after the district court decision in Wisniewski, in 2008, the United States
District Court for the Central District of California court ruled on O.Z. v. Board of Trustees.472
Middle school student O.Z. made a slide show depicting the murder of his teacher, Mrs.
Rosenlof, then posted it on YouTube.473 The video contained captions in red print referring to
Mrs. Rosenlof in a disparaging manner and describing the action in the photos.474 The slide
show images were graphic and the verbiage used was crude.475 A couple of months after the
slide show was posted on YouTube, Mrs. Rosenlof Googled her own name to see what she
would find. The slide show came up. Along with the slide show, a written description of the
slide show‟s content also was displayed. It conveyed that the slide show was a video of a
student killing a teacher named Mrs. Rosenlof and that the video was actually shot in Mrs.
Rosenlof‟s classroom during class.476 The video so distressed Mrs. Rosenlof that she became
sick and endured multiple sleepless nights.477 Mrs. Rosenlof told Hughes Middle School
Principal Monica Daley about the existence of the posting, which prompted Principal Daley to
471
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investigate the situation and communicate with O.Z. and her mother that O.Z. would be
suspended and transferred to another school.478 O.Z. argued that her First Amendment right to
free speech covered the slide show and, as a result, discipline for the slide show was a
violation of the U.S. Constitution.479 Thus, O.Z. sought a preliminary injunction, asking the
court to force the school district to allow O.Z. to remain at Hughes Middle School.480
The court identified Tinker as the applicable standard in this case.481 Though O.Z.
claimed the slide show was just a joke, the court found it reasonable for school administrators
to believe the YouTube post would create a substantial disruption at school due to the intense
words used in the captions and the strange photos which accompanied the captions.482 The
court did not support the notion that O.Z. was immune to school discipline just because she
created and posted the slide show away from school.483 The court reasoned that other courts,
like in Wisniewski and Thomas, have ruled that off-campus student behavior can create a
reasonable threat of substantial disruption at school.484 Bolstering its stance on this point, the
court pointed out Mrs. Rosenlof did discover the YouTube post even though it was created
off-campus.485
The court noted school officials are more equipped to make decisions regarding what
is best for students than are federal courts.486 Furthermore, the court recognized a middle
school student being forced to move to another school can be stressful. Nonetheless, the court
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asserted O.Z. was not convincing in her claim that the discipline would cause “irreparable
harm.”487 In addition, the court was not convinced that O.Z.‟s case had a high probability of
success if it moved forward.488 Consequently, the court denied O.Z.‟s request for preliminary
injunction.489 There was no appeal.

Evans v. Bayer (2010)
Two years after O.Z., the United States District Court for the Southern District of
Florida heard Evans v. Bayer.490 Katherine Evans, a high school senior, using her home
computer after school hours, formed a Facebook group intended to provide an avenue for
students to vent about a teacher. Evans titled the group, “Ms. Sarah Phelps is the worst teacher
I‟ve ever met” and she posted Phelps‟ photo there.491 Evans displayed her opinion by stating
that Phelps was the “worst teacher I‟ve ever met!” and going on to say that her behaviors were
“insane” and then inviting others to express their “feelings of hatred.”492 It does not appear
from court documents that any other students posted their feelings of hatred. However, three
students actually posted words of support for Phelps and admonished Evans for forming the
Facebook group.493 Evans removed the posting after a couple of days. Phelps never saw it and
no school disruption occurred in connection with it.494 High School Principal Peter Bayer
became aware of the posting after Evans took it down, and he suspended Evans from school
487
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for three days and changed her schedule from AP courses to some with less weight toward
GPA calculation.495
Evans filed suit, claiming her posting took place in an off-campus public forum and
did not threaten violence in any way.496 Therefore, Evans argued, the discipline violated her
First Amendment rights. Evans sought an injunction which would require Bayer to remove
records from her permanent file pertaining to the discipline and expunging any mention of the
three-day suspension.497 Bayer argued that he had an obligation to discipline Evans in order to
protect the school environment from “potentially disruptive” conduct.498 Bayer additionally
contended Evans did not have a clearly established right to create the posting about a
teacher.499
The court brought forth the question of whether or not Evans‟s expression should be
considered on-campus. The court reasoned even though Evans directed her posting message at
a school employee, it was not enough to put the expression on-campus.500 Furthermore, the
court observed the speech was created off-campus, it was never accessed nor brought onto
campus, and when its existence came to Bayer‟s attention, the posting had already been taken
down.501 As a result, the court deemed Evans‟ Facebook posting to be off-campus
expression.502 The court was quick to point out, however, that off-campus expression can be
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subject to school discipline if it falls into a category unprotected by the Constitution.503
Indeed, Bayer contended that Tinker allowed school administrators to protect the school from
disruptive expression like the negative comments Evans posted about Ms. Phelps.504 The
court, however, rejected this argument, stating there was no clear indication of a disruption
connected to the posting. The court said upholding the discipline for Evans‟ speech would
forbid students from making even minor criticisms of their teachers.505 Another unprotected
speech category which Bayer suggested the court consider in upholding the discipline was the
speech found in Fraser. Again, the court determined Evans‟ speech was not vulgar, it was not
delivered before a captive audience, and it did not undercut the “fundamental values” of the
educational process.506 Consequently, the court found Evans‟ speech to be constitutionally
protected and denied Bayer‟s motion to dismiss.507 However, without addressing Evans‟
request for an injunction, the court dismissed it, but left the door open for Evans “to file an
amended complaint.”508 No such amendment was filed.

Doninger v. Niehoff (2011)
The next year came the 2011 United States District Court for the District of
Connecticut decision in Doninger v. Niehoff.509 The dispute revolved around an issue with the
scheduling of an annual school event called Jamfest that high school student Avery Doninger
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and the student council helped plan.510 The event was scheduled to take place in the high
school‟s new auditorium.511 This new auditorium required a person with special knowledge
and skills to properly run the light and sound equipment. Due to an unforeseen conflict with
the personal schedule of the teacher who possessed this knowledge, either the date or location
of the event had to be moved, much to the dismay of Doninger and other members of the
student council who had worked to plan the event.512 In response to this scheduling problem,
Doninger accessed a computer while at school and sent a mass email to parents, students, and
others providing contact information for school administrators and urging recipients to contact
the school to complain.513 And complain they did, as the district office and the high school
office were deluged with calls and emails over multiple days, causing Principal Karissa
Niehoff to be called away from working with staff members on a training project. 514
Subsequently, while at home after school hours, Doninger published a message on a “publicly
accessible” website about the incident, further encouraging action by readers and referring to
school administrators as “douchebags.”515 The next day, a crowd of disgruntled students
assembled near the district office to protest about what they perceived was a decision by the
administration to cancel Jamfest altogether, which was not the case.516 Here again, students
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and school administrators were pulled away from their educational endeavors like class
sessions and other school activities.517
Days later, Principal Niehoff denied Doninger the opportunity to accept a nomination
for Senior Class Secretary.518 Principal Niehoff deemed the website posting a violation of the
student handbook ethics code to which Doninger had agreed in writing earlier in the year,
prior to agreeing to participate in the extra-curricular activity of becoming a student class
officer.519 The lawsuit, filed by Doninger‟s mother, requested the court to order the school
district to allow her daughter several privileges set aside for class officers, including being
allowed to speak at graduation.520 Doninger claimed Niehoff and other school district officials
had violated her First Amendment right to free expression.521
The district court concluded Principal Niehoff did not violate Doninger‟s First
Amendment rights when she prohibited Doninger from running for Senior Class Secretary as
punishment for a scathing website blog entry (described below) that Doninger posted from her
home computer during non-school hours.522 Doninger appealed to the Second Circuit, which
upheld the district court decision, declaring the First Amendment right which Doninger was
claiming, that is, to write whatever she wished on a website blog post and to use mass email
to encourage people to flood the school administration offices with complaint phone calls and
emails, was not clearly established.523 The court determined Doninger‟s First Amendment
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rights were not impinged because there was no clearly established right to publish the website
blog entry which she intended to reach campus.524 Furthermore, the court determined there
was no clearly established right for Doninger to be allowed to run for a class office.525
Additionally, though the Second Circuit recognized the Supreme Court had not provided clear
guidance on “a school‟s authority to regulate expression that, like Doninger‟s, does not occur
on school grounds or at a school-sponsored event,”526 the court referenced two cases
addressing the issue. First, the Second Circuit referred to Thomas v. Board of Education,527
noting Thomas “does not clearly establish that off-campus speech-related conduct may never
be the basis for discipline by school officials.”528 The Second Circuit referred to its decision
in Wisniewski v. Board of Education,529 asserting that it allowed school administrators to
discipline students for “off-campus speech-related conduct.”530 Also, the Second Circuit
suggested Tinker afforded school administrators plenty of fodder in this case to deduce that
disruptions to the educational process were foreseeable and in fact did occur, spurred by
Doninger‟s emails and website posting.531 In communicating the reasonableness of the school
administrators‟ actions, the court pointed to the torrent of phone calls and emails received by
the school district in response to Doninger‟s email blast and website blog post, the group of
angry students who gathered outside the administrative offices, the missing of class time by
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students and the pulling away of school officials from other duties to deal with the issue.532
Furthermore, the court recognized that the discipline meted out to Doninger did not keep her
from educational classroom endeavors; she was not suspended from school. The discipline
dealt only with her being allowed to participate as a class officer, which required that she
function as a liaison between the student body and faculty/administration.533 Thus, the court
held that since Doninger‟s actions were obviously disruptive and since she felt compelled to
post in a website blog that the district office personnel were “douchebags,”534 then Principal
Niehoff‟s stance that Doninger could no longer serve in a student leadership capacity was
reasonable.535 The Supreme Court denied a petition for writ of certiorari to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.536

J.S. v. Blue Mountain School District (2011)
In 2011, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit was deciding both
J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain School District537 and Layshock v. Hermitage538 virtually
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concurrently. J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain School District, later renamed as Snyder,539
involved J.S., a middle school student in the Blue Mountain School District, who posted, from
her home computer, a webpage on MySpace which was disparaging to her principal, James
McGonigle. In response, school officials suspended J.S. She and her parents brought suit,
arguing multiple constitutional violations occurred, including a violation of her First
Amendment free speech rights.540
The facts of the case indicate that J.S. and a friend created the profile of Principal
McGonigle on her home computer.541 The profile contained Principal McGonigle‟s picture,
though not his name, the school‟s name, nor its location. J.S. made the profile fully accessible
to anyone who knew the address or who searched MySpace for key phrases included in the
profile.542 Moreover, the MySpace profile featured tasteless subject matter, offensive words,
and crude personal attacks targeting Principal McGonigle and his family.543 However, though
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the webpage content was unseemly, J.S. contended it was so exaggeratingly offensive that no
reasonable person would take it seriously.544 Furthermore, J.S. attested that not only did she
never mean for the profile to be taken seriously, she also did not intend for it to come onto the
school campus. This assertion was supported by the fact that the day after creating the profile,
she restricted access to the webpage to just over twenty friends who were students in the
school district.545 She implemented the restricted access after a number of students at school
had told her they had seen the open-access profile and believed it was amusing.546 To further
support J.S.‟s assertion, testimony showed the profile was never accessed and viewed at
school because the district‟s computers prevented entry to the MySpace website.547
McGonigle first learned about the MySpace profile‟s existence from a student who
happened to be in his office on another matter.548 At McGonigle‟s request, the student brought
him a printed copy of the profile and told him J.S. created it.549 During a meeting with J.S.
regarding the MySpace profile, J.S. initially denied having created it, but soon confessed to
having made it.550 Principal McGonigle thus determined J.S. had committed violations of both
the Blue Mountain Middle School Disciplinary Code and the computer use policy and
suspended her for ten days.551 School officials claimed the profile caused disruptions at
school, highlighted by “general rumblings,” which included students discussing the profile in
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multiple classes, both amongst themselves and with a teacher.552 Additionally, a couple of
school counselors‟ schedules needed adjustment to assist in dealing with J.S. and the
situation.553
The District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania originally determined that
even though no significant interference with the educational process occurred in connection
with the MySpace post, J.S.‟s actions were nonetheless punishable because a clear correlation
existed “between her off-campus action and on-campus effect.”554 Since the district court
determined that no educational interference occurred at school, it decided Tinker was not the
operative case on which to base its judgment.555 Instead, the district court deemed the content
of the MySpace profile to be rude and insulting to Principal McGonigle, it ultimately did have
an effect on-campus, and the discipline was thus warranted under Fraser, due to the vulgar
and lewd terms used.556 Even though the court referenced Fraser, there was no discussion of
the school sponsorship issue, which was a major pillar of the Supreme Court‟s Fraser
decision.557
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals disagreed and explained its decision to reverse and
remand the district court‟s ruling on the First Amendment violation count, noting that since no
significant educational disturbance was evident as a result of the MySpace profile, then school
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officials abridged J.S.‟s First Amendment rights by disciplining her for the posting.558 The
Third Circuit took the stance that Fraser provides an exception to the free speech tenets
provided in Tinker, but that Fraser does not stand alone as an autonomous precedent.559
The Third Circuit further delineated its disagreement with the district court by noting
that if the armbands in Tinker, which served as a highly charged symbol of the contentious
and emotional conflict involving many Americans in Viet Nam, were not enough to
reasonably lead school officials to anticipate a substantial disruption of the educational
process at school, then J.S.‟s MySpace profile could not rise to this level.560 Moreover, the
Third Circuit pointed to J.S.‟s intent as a factor in its decision, noting that she wrote it as a
prank, she limited viewing rights to the post, and even though Principal McGonigle
undoubtedly was humiliated because his picture was posted with the written words, J.S. did
not provide any further written documentation linking the words she wrote specifically to the
school principal in the Blue Mountain School District.561 Also, the school district took
measures with its computer web filters to prevent students from having the ability to access
MySpace. As a result, no students logged on to MySpace or were able to view the posting
from school.562 Finally, the Third Circuit was clear in its opinion of the power of public
school administrators by stating, “The authority of public school officials is not boundless,”563
yet the court then acknowledged the difficult balancing act facing school administrators and
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courts in the quest to protect the free speech rights of students while preserving order in the
educational process.564
The Third Circuit contemplated Fraser’s inapplicability to this case by writing that
using Fraser to control the decision would give far too much latitude to school officials to
control student speech off school grounds, going so far as to call such latitude “dangerously
overbroad.”565 The court then settled on Tinker as the controlling case, stating that “under
Tinker…the School District violated J.S.‟s First Amendment free speech rights when it
suspended her for creating the profile.”566 Consequently, the Third Circuit reversed the district
court‟s decision on the violation of J.S.‟s First Amendment rights and determined her rights
had been violated.567 In 2012, the Supreme Court denied a petition for writ of certiorari to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.568

Layshock v. Hermitage (2011)
In 2011, the other case the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit was
deciding was Layshock v. Hermitage.569 In Layshock, the court made clear how it felt about
the First Amendment rights of students early in its opinion. In citing Tinker, the court declared
the constitutional protections of the First Amendment do not allow school officials to extend
their power “beyond the schoolyard to impose what might otherwise be appropriate
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discipline.”570 The case arose when Justin Layshock, a student at Hickory High School, using
his grandmother‟s computer at her house, designed and posted a MySpace webpage which,
using vulgar language, poked fun at his principal, Eric Trosch.571 The school district
determined Justin had violated several sections of the school discipline code.572 School
officials suspended Justin ten days for his actions.573 Subsequently, Justin brought suit,
claiming the school district had no standing to punish him because his webpage was protected
by the First Amendment.574
The Third Circuit upheld the district court‟s ruling in favor of Justin, agreeing the
suspension “transcended the protection of free expression guaranteed by the First
Amendment.”575 The Third Circuit acknowledged some disruptions did occur as a result of
the MySpace webpage because Justin shared access to it with friends at Hickory High,
including logging into it on a school computer during the school day. After that happened,
testimony showed that news of the webpage‟s existence “spread like wildfire” and it seemed
that nearly the entire Hickory High School population was aware of it.576 In response, the
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location of computer usage was restricted to only the learning center and computer labs so
school officials could more closely monitor internet access. Additionally, to help control
access even further, school administrators decided to cancel computer programming classes
altogether.577
Justin‟s complaint claimed his punishment was an infringement of his First
Amendment free speech rights.578 In rendering its decision, both the district court and the
Third Circuit referenced Tinker, stating that the schoolhouse gate referred to in Tinker does
not apply strictly to “the brick and mortar surrounding the school yard,” though there must be
limits on the reach of school officials.579 Also, since the school district did not convince the
district court that any significant disruption occurred in the educational process of the school
as a result of the MySpace posting, and the school district did not dispute this ruling, then the
Third Circuit agreed with the district court‟s decision that Tinker did not apply to this case.580
The Third Circuit strongly worded its opinion on this issue, referring to the analysis in
Thomas581 when asserting school administrators‟ arms cannot be so long as to extend “into
Justin‟s grandmother‟s home” to levy discipline for what he did there on her computer.582
Though school administrators have much discretion as to how to effectively handle student
actions while at school, the Third Circuit did not believe the First Amendment allowed school
administrators that same authority over students when they are away from the school
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setting.583 Finally, the court acknowledged Justin did access the school district website, made
a copy of a picture of Principal Trosch which he found there, and used the picture on the
MySpace posting.584 These facts supported the school district‟s claim that Justin‟s speech
actually began on school property when he entered the school campus in the form of the
district‟s website, stole the picture of the principal, and used it inappropriately, in violation of
the Hermitage School District Discipline Code and computer policy.585 However, the court
determined that accessing the school district website did not equate to him being at school,
and as such, school administrators violated Justin‟s First Amendment rights by suspending
him for his conduct away from school.586 The Supreme Court refused to hear this case as well.

R.S. v. Minnewaska (2012)
A year after Layshock and Blue Mountain were decided, the United States District
Court for the District of Minnesota heard R.S. v. Minnewaska Area School District.587 R.S., a
Minnewaska Area Middle School (MAMS) student, posted a Facebook message stating how
much she hated “Kathy,” a person employed as a hall monitor at her school, because R.S.
claimed Kathy was mean to her.588 R.S. posted the message from home during non-school
hours and allowed only her Facebook friends access to it.589 However, one of those Facebook
friends shared the message with Principal Pat Falk, who treated it as a bullying incident. He
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required R.S. to apologize to Kathy and issued R.S. a detention.590 R.S. reacted to the
discipline by posting a follow-up message, “I want to know who the f--- told on me.”591
Someone also shared this message with Principal Falk, who responded by assessing R.S. a
one-day in-school suspension and banned R.S. from going on an upcoming class ski trip.592
R.S. filed suit, alleging, among other counts, that her First Amendment rights were
violated under the U.S. Constitution.593 The school district moved for dismissal of all claims,
asserting it followed all appropriate policies.594
The court indicated that Tinker, Wisniewski, and Doe v. Pulaski (citing Watts)595
applied to this case, opining that those cases serve as applicable summaries of the rules for
off-campus student expression. In particular, the court maintained that off-campus student
expression is protected by the First Amendment and is not subject to school discipline unless
the expression is considered a true threat or it creates a substantial school disruption.596 The
court determined R.S.‟s Facebook postings were not nearly as volatile as students made in
other circumstances where courts upheld discipline.597 Thus, the court concluded R.S.‟s
Facebook postings were not threats.598 In addition, the court observed that R.S. stating on
Facebook she hated a faculty member and posting a crude question about who told on her
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were unlikely to cause a school disruption.599 The court determined R.S.‟s speech to be clearly
nonviolent and nondisruptive off-campus speech and, as such, protected by the First
Amendment.600 The court noted this case is in its infancy, and in light of the facts currently
available, it denied the Minnewaska School District‟s motion to dismiss the First Amendment
claim and allowed it to proceed for further review.601

Bell v. Itawamba (2014)
Late in 2014, the Fifth Circuit reversed a decision by the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Mississippi, Eastern Division, in Bell v. Itawamba County School
Board.602 Taylor Bell, a senior at Itawamba, created and recorded a song and posted it on
Facebook and YouTube.603 Bell‟s song crudely alleged two coaches behaved inappropriately
with female students.604 The song included verses describing how the coaches drool when
looking down girls‟ shirts, how they “mess” with certain girls, and how listeners should put
up a middle finger “if you can‟t stand that nigga.”605 In addition, the song took a threatening
tone with phrases describing how the coaches were “going to get a pistol down your mouth”
and “middle fingers up if you want to cap that nigga.”606 It is unclear from the case
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background description how school officials became aware of the song‟s existence, but indeed
they did. In response, school administrators suspended Bell indefinitely pending a hearing. 607
The Itawamba County School Board Disciplinary Committee held the hearing and determined
that Bell‟s posting harassed, intimidated, and threatened teachers. As a consequence, the
committee suspended Bell for seven days and transferred him to an alternative school for the
remainder of the grading period.608 Following an appeal of the decision by Bell, the full
school board upheld the committee‟s decision.
Bell filed a complaint with the court, contending, among other counts, that the
school‟s discipline violated his First Amendment right to free speech.609 The court cited
Tinker in noting that off-campus student expression which causes a material or substantial
disruption at school can be cause for school discipline.610 In addition, the court articulated that
Porter served to add the condition that in order for the discipline to be constitutional, the
student needed to take steps which showed intent for the speech to reach the campus.611 Since
Bell posted the song for over 1,300 Facebook “friends” and for an unlimited audience to
access via YouTube, the court reasoned Tinker was applicable even though it was created,
performed, recorded, and distributed off-campus.612 Once the court determined Tinker
applicable, it identified the primary questions it needed to consider: 1) if Bell‟s song caused or
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was meant to cause a material or substantial school disruption and 2) if school administrators
could reasonably forecast such a disruption at school.613
The district court sided with the Itawamba School Board in its finding that the song
and its accessible postings on Facebook and YouTube “constituted harassment and
intimidation of teachers and possible threats against teachers."614 The court record indicated
further that actual disruptions to the school environment did occur as Coach Wildmon and
Coach Rainey both testified their teaching styles were negatively impacted because students
were more suspicious of them.615 Coach Wildmon also testified he felt threatened by the lyrics
which discussed killing him.616 Consequently, the court found Bell‟s song did cause a material
and substantial disruption and it was reasonable for school administrators to foresee that it
would. Thus, the court determined the song did not enjoy First Amendment protection and the
school district‟s moves to discipline Bell for posting the song were reasonable.617 Bell‟s First
Amendment violation claim was dismissed.618 Bell appealed to the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals.
The Fifth Circuit reversed, awarding damages to Bell and rendering summary
judgment against the school district.619 The Fifth Circuit plainly identified the case‟s central
question as: Did school officials violate Bell‟s First Amendment free speech rights by
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disciplining him for his off-campus speech which was posted on the internet?620 The court
claimed the district court‟s application of Tinker was faulty for two reasons: first, Tinker does
not apply to off-campus speech, and second, the evidence did not reveal the occurrence of a
material and substantial disruption on-campus nor could one have reasonably been
anticipated, as required by Tinker.621 The Fifth Circuit reiterated its stance by asserting that
none of the Supreme Court‟s student speech cases, which includes Tinker, pertain to student
speech which happens off-campus and not at a school-sponsored event.622 The Fifth Circuit
clearly delineated its opinion of Tinker’s application by maintaining the Tinker Court did not
intend for its opinion to allow school officials to censor student speech occurring at home and
off-campus.623 Additionally, when the Tinker Court stated its analysis applied to student
“conduct… in class or out of it,”624 the Supreme Court was merely “indicating that the
delicate balance between the protection of free speech rights and the regulation of student
conduct extends to all facets of on-campus student speech.”625
The court extended its discussion of why it decided against the school district by
supposing for a moment that Tinker could be applied to off-campus speech.626 Given that
verity, the court affirmed the student‟s internet rap song did not lead to any classes being
disturbed nor was there any upheaval or disorderly conduct at school.627 Moreover, the court
determined the song was completely created and posted to the internet off-campus. Because
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school internet filters blocked Facebook and since student possession of cell phones was
forbidden by school rules, the possibility of accessing the rap song on-campus was greatly
reduced.628 Thus, no nexus existed. Therefore, the court rejected the school district‟s claim
that it projected an on-campus material and substantial disruption in connection with Bell‟s
song.629
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629
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Chapter 3
ANALYSIS

Introduction
The way students express their views and interact with one another has changed
dramatically over the last four decades since the Supreme Court handed down its 1969 Tinker
v. Des Moines630 decision. Today‟s students text or post to the Internet many of the
communications their forerunners used to either write in a note or scrawl on the bathroom
stall.631 Administrative options for responding to those past forms of student communication
were clearer than the options for responding to student cyberspeech. If a student was caught
writing a note during class or there was a message carved into a school bathroom stall, the
administrator generally did not pause to consider whether the student speech was on-campus
and thus under the school‟s jurisdiction. Also, if the speech caused a material and substantial
disruption to the process of educating students, then pursuant to Tinker, administrators were
on solid ground to impose disciplinary consequences. However, the types of message delivery
students utilize today via the Internet and social networking sites have clouded the distinction
between on-campus and off-campus student speech. Furthermore, the demarcation is
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obscured for when school administrators may discipline a student for speech without
trampling on First Amendment rights.632 In crafting student handbook language and
makingdecisions regarding student discipline, school administrators often rely upon their own
education, training, and experience. Furthermore, they likely consult with colleagues and legal
counsel regarding the appropriate items and wording to include based on applicable case law.
However, since the Supreme Court has declined requests to review a student cyberspeech case
and because court rulings on cyberspeech issues have been inconsistent, school administrators
must act with care when imposing discipline for cyberspeech incidents. Even in cases
presenting virtually the same facts, the courts have often ruled differently. For example, two
Third Circuit cases from 2010, J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain School District633 and
Layshock v. Hermitage School District,634 presented similar fact patterns. In Blue Mountain,
the court decided in favor of school officials who disciplined a student for posting a fake
profile of the student‟s principal on MySpace. The posting included personal attacks on not
only the principal but also his family.635 The profile was created away from school, during
non-school hours using a privately owned computer. Since the district‟s technology filters
blocked access to MySpace, students were not able to open the posting at school. However,
the Third Circuit held “off-campus speech that causes or reasonably threatens to cause a
substantial disruption or material interference with a school need not satisfy any geographical
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technicality in order to be regulated pursuant to Tinker.”636 The court concluded the student‟s
off-campus speech created a “reasonable possibility of a future disruption”637 and found for
school officials.
On the same day the Blue Mountain decision was released, a different Third Circuit
panel ruled on another student speech case, Layshock v. Hermitage School District. Here, the
student, Justin Layshock, also created a MySpace profile of his principal on his grandmother‟s
home computer. The profile depicted the principal as being “big” in a variety of ways,
including being a big drug user, not having big genitals, and being a big homosexual.638 The
court noted the profile had caused disruptions and was accessed on-campus.639 Even so, the
Third Circuit refused to treat the profile as on-campus speech and determined school officials
over-reached in disciplining Justin for his off-campus conduct. The panel ruled for the
student. Shortly after issuing these divergent rulings, the Third Circuit granted a request to
rehear the cases en banc. Thereafter, the en banc panel reversed the Blue Mountain
decision.640 As such, if two appellate panels each within the Third Circuit struggle to render
consistent ruling in cases featuring similar facts, it is understandable that school
administrators are confounded when faced with student cyberspeech attacking a faculty
member.
Even in this age of online student expression, for over 40 years Tinker has remained
the benchmark case for student speech cases connected to the school. The fifteen lower
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federal court decisions and one state-level decision reviewed in this study all involved student
speech targeting school employees. In each case Tinker was applied and provided the
foundation for each court‟s analysis either singularly or in tandem with other cases. This
chapter discusses how both Supreme Court and lower court student speech decisions are
influencing the analysis of student off-campus cyberspeech cases. In particular, the analytical
focus lies with Tinker’s first prong and its application to off-campus student cyberspeech
targeting school employees.

Tinker Is the Benchmark
Tinker is widely recognized as the landmark student speech decision.641 Here, the
Supreme Court created a two-prong test for analyzing and regulating on-campus studentsponsored speech deemed to have either caused a material and substantial disruption to the
school environment or infringed upon the rights of others to be left alone.642 In particular,
every court ruling reviewed in this study applied Tinker‟s first prong, material and substantial
disruption, as a tool to analyze each of the sixteen decisions. The rulings in these cases
yielded eleven decisions in favor of students and five decisions in favor of school officials.643
In the eleven cases in which courts found for the student, the court could not connect a
material and substantial disruption to the student speech. In six of those cases, the court
specifically stated the First Amendment protected student speech that did not cause a material
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and substantial disruption.644 In analyzing the five court decisions in favor of the school
district, each court found either some form of material and substantial disruption actually
occurred or was reasonably foreseeable. Thus school officials were justified in imposing
discipline.

Tinker’s Two Prongs
Tinker set forth two distinct circumstances where student on-campus expression could
be limited. Lower courts like the Ninth Circuit have opined that both of Tinker‟s prongs give
school officials a standard by which to discipline students for their speech.645 However, since
the Tinker decision in 1969, lower court decisions involving student speech have relied almost
exclusively on the material and substantial prong and have ignored the second prong. The
second prong sought to protect others who might be negatively affected by the speech. The
Tinker majority proclaimed student speech that invades “the rights of others is … not
immunized by the constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech.”646 This verbiage can be
traced back to Justice Louis Brandeis‟ dissenting opinion in Olmstead v. U.S.647 In Olmstead,
Justice Brandeis asserted the United States Constitution provided civilized citizens the broad
and valuable right to be left alone.648 He further stressed this right must be protected and any
invasion of the right to be left alone was a violation of the Constitution.649 Even though courts
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reference Tinker‟s first prong in all student speech cases, only a few courts, like the Fourth
Circuit,650 have applied or at least mentioned the second prong, the right to be left alone, as
having relevance as a potential standard in student First Amendment free speech cases. In
some instances, the second prong may even be applicable to student cyberspeech cases. The
Ninth Circuit, for example, has avowed that under Tinker, student speech which encroaches
on the rights of others can be disciplined.651 However, to date, Tinker‟s second prong has only
been considered in cases where the student cyberspeech victimized other students.652 In cases
involving student cyberspeech targeting adults, courts have exclusively applied Tinker‟s first
prong and have avoided using the second prong. While Tinker‟s second prong may be gaining
acceptance and perhaps will evolve into a viable judicial tool in future student cyberspeech
decisions, based on jurisprudence employing the second prong so far, courts have not viewed
it as applicable to cases involving student cyberspeech targeting school faculty members. This
may be because courts do not believe adult school employees have a constitutional right to be
left alone in their school workplace.653

Other Significant Supreme Court Cases Besides Tinker
In addition to Tinker serving as the foundation for all sixteen reviewed cases, several
courts also cited other cases as being significant in their decision making. For example,
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Fraser654 was considered for its applicability in three cases. However, it was the basis for the
ruling in only one case, and that court jointly applied Fraser in tandem with Tinker.655 The
Supreme Court‟s Fraser ruling was very fact specific and therefore has only been applied to
“lewd and indecent” on-campus speech.656 Since that decision, subsequent Supreme Courts
have admitted confusion regarding the basis used to decide Fraser.657 Chief Justice Roberts,
in Morse,658 observed the Fraser Court was unmistakably focusing on the actual content of
Fraser‟s speech, its inappropriate nature, and its contrast to the political implication of the
armbands in Tinker.659 Furthermore, Roberts asserted the “mode of analysis set forth in Tinker
is not absolute.”660 The Court went on to opine that school officials may regulate on-campus
student speech if they deem it inappropriate.661 However, the Fraser Court‟s decision did not
employ Tinker‟s substantial disruption analysis.662 It appears Fraser may be too weak to stand
on its own as a foundational cyberspeech precedent.663 This is largely because, as Chief
Justice Roberts suggested in Morse,664Fraser is only applicable to on-campus, schoolsponsored speech, such as student speech during a school assembly.665 Some scholars support
this view and believe Fraser‟s discipline would not have been allowed had he posted his
654
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speech on the internet instead of presenting it in front of a captive audience at a school
assembly.666 Other scholars agree and say school officials and courts alike should be aware
the Fraser holding was very specific and should only be cited as the basis for decision when
the student speech both occurs on-campus and is lewd and/or vulgar.667
However, J.S. v. Bethlehem668 applied Fraser in tandem with Tinker to online student
speech. The court deemed Fraser applicable due to the negative effect the student‟s lewd,
vulgar, and plainly offensive webpage contents had upon the targeted teacher.669 There are
scholars who support this stance. Rose Spellman, California attorney and legal scholar, has
opined that teaching is not simply limited to the text of books.670 Indeed, as Spellman further
explains, schools are responsible to set the example by educating students about how to
behave in a civilized society.671 As such, any student speech, including off-campus
cyberspeech, which serves to harass or threaten educators is unacceptable and school policies
designed to quell such behavior should be allowed via Fraser.672 On the other hand, there are
scholars who believe that courts like the Third Circuit, which favors an expansive
interpretation of Fraser, provide school officials too much power to censor student speech.673
The Sixth Circuit, for example, used an expanded view of Fraser to uphold discipline for a
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student who wore a concert t-shirt to school which in the view of school administrators served
to enervate its educational objectives.674 Some scholars believe that when courts put the
whims of school officials too far above students‟ constitutional rights, then they are
effectively requiring students to "shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or
expression at the schoolhouse gate."675
The other two Supreme Court student speech cases, Hazelwood and Morse, were each
mentioned in only one reviewed case, and neither was used as the standard for the decision.
These two Supreme Court decisions are just too narrow to apply to cyberspeech cases.676
Hazelwood, for example, dealt with an administrator making a time-sensitive educational
decision about what to include in an issue of the school newspaper.677 And the Morse Court
specifically stated that its decision addressed only the issue of allowing school policy to be
upheld when the discipline is aimed at thwarting the promotion of illegal drug use.678

Lower Court Cases Often Cited
Also, there are two lower court decisions frequently cited in combination with Tinker.
The Second Circuit‟s decision in Thomas679 was referenced in its own decisions in Wisniewski
and Doninger. Also, the Central District Court of California discussed the application of
674
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Thomas in its O.Z. decision.680 In those cases, the courts believed Thomas allowed for the
possibility school officials could discipline students for their off-campus speech.681 It is Judge
Newman‟s concurring opinion in Thomas which suggests this possibility. Judge Newman
opined that student speech could be disciplined if it was clearly lewd and was disseminated to
school-age students.682 He also said that the authority of school officials to deal with such
conduct does not end at the school‟s boundary lines.683 Perhaps most applicable to instances
of student cyberspeech, he wrote “Territoriality is not necessarily a useful concept in
determining the limit of their [school officials‟] authority.”684 Furthermore, Wisniewski685 was
also discussed by the Doninger and O.Z. courts, while the District Court of Minnesota
referenced Wisniewski in R.S. v. Minnewaska686 for the same reason as Thomas was discussed.
These two cases provide at minimum the notion that school authorities may have
constitutional permission to discipline students for off-campus speech if it could be
reasonably anticipated to come onto school grounds or if it has the potential to cause a
substantial disruption at school. A detailed discussion of Wisniewski’s potential application to
future student speech cases follows later in this chapter.
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Jurisdiction
In Layshock v. Hermitage,687 the United States District Court for the Western District
of Pennsylvania referred to school officials‟ jurisdiction over students as a “threshold” for
courts when considering cases pertaining to off-campus student speech.688 Some commenters
believe school administrators‟ jurisdiction to discipline students for off-campus speech is
vague at best due to the inconsistent application of benchmarks to these cases.689 As a result,
these commenters assert victims of cyberbullying and other inappropriate cyberspeech are
often left unprotected from these attacks.690
The term “jurisdiction” is defined in the context of this study as school officials‟
authority to levy discipline. The Cornell University Legal Information Institute equates the
term “jurisdiction” to the word “power.”691 So when does a school administrator have the
power, without running afoul of the Constitution, to discipline a student for off-campus
speech? Courts generally seek to first resolve this jurisdictional question before proceeding to
subsequent issues. It is accomplished by looking at some key factors.

Nexus
The term “nexus” is defined as a point of causal intersection, link, relation, or
connection.692 In the case of cyberspeech, the term pertains to whether the student speech, like
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an email sent using school computers, is considered on-campus or off-campus speech. Nexus
also considers whether a sufficient link exists between the student speech and disruptions or
other incidents at school. Prior to the creation of the internet, there was a clear demarcation
between what occurred at home and what occurred at school. They were two separate and
distinctly different physical spaces.693 However, today, what students do at home, especially if
they post it on the internet, is often easily accessed by large numbers of people. Even so, for
school officials to be on solid ground in disciplining students for their cyberspeech, they must
first establish a strong link between the cyberspeech and the school.694
If that link, or nexus, can be established, then courts generally will consider if the
school officials‟ disciplinary actions were warranted. As outlined above, courts often support
the imposition of discipline if the speech resulted in a substantial or material disruption at
school. In instances where the student speech was created, accessed, or brought to school, the
nexus is clear.695 In other cases, the student speech either occurred or was created away from
school, did not come to school in hard-copy form, nor was accessed at school via the internet.
Under these conditions courts generally found no nexus between the student speech and the
school.696 So, nexus is a gateway issue courts address when determining if school
administrators had jurisdiction to discipline students for off-campus speech.697 Of the sixteen
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reviewed cases, courts determined no clear nexus existed between the off-campus student
speech and the school nine times.698 In all nine of these cases, the court found for the student.
In the other seven reviewed cases, courts determined a nexus existed between the student
speech and the school district. In two of those cases, the court still found for the student.699
Courts found for the school district in the other five cases where a nexus was established
between the student speech and the school district.700
The following situations in the reviewed cases were not enough for the court to find a
nexus existed between the student speech and the school: a newspaper about school created
off school grounds,701 flipping a teacher the bird in a restaurant parking lot on the weekend,702
social media posts seeking others to agree teacher X was the worst teacher ever or the staff
member should be hated,703 a rap song alleging male teachers were engaging in improper
intimate relations with female students,704 and web postings containing negative comments
and pictures about the school principal.705
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Conversely, a couple of examples of student speech deemed by courts to have created
a sufficient nexus included student drawings depicting the school being attacked which were
brought to school by a third party706 and a student using online postings and emails to inflame
parents and students leading to protests at school, students to skip class, and both to flood the
school with complaint phone calls.707
Thus, it appears in the reviewed cases courts did not believe a nexus was established
when the student speech originated off-campus (and stayed off-campus by virtue of it never
arriving in hard-copy form or not being accessed online at school), and the negative nature of
the expression was clearly an opinion as opposed to being hostile. On the other hand, when
the student online expression was accessed at school or came to school in hard-copy form,
then a nexus was created. Also, a nexus was found to exist when the student expression
aggressively expressed a desire for a teacher to be murdered or the school to be attacked.
Finally, a nexus was established when the student cyberspeech led to a material and
substantial disruption or it created a foreseeable threat of one. In summary, though a nexus
must exist for a school district to have a chance at prevailing in court when disciplining a
student for their speech, it does not mean that the presence of a nexus requires discipline.
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Table 1
Courts’ Nexus Findings

Cases

Court Found NO Nexus
Between the Student
Speech and the School:
Found for Student

Court Found Nexus:
Decided for School
District

Court Found Nexus:
Decided for Student

Thomas, Klein, Emmett, Flaherty,
Evans, Blue Mountain, Layshock,
Minnewaska, Bell

Bethlehem, Porter,
Wisniewski, O.Z., Doninger

Beussink, Killion

Intent
Nexus is not the only way courts determined school district jurisdiction for student
off-campus speech incidents. In the reviewed cases, courts also examined the intent of the
student. There were 11 cases in which the court discussed the importance of the student‟s
intent.708 Instances of intent focused on the student speaker‟s efforts to cause a disturbance at
school or to inflict some sort of harm or reputation stain on the victim, both of which could
establish a nexus. Five times the court sided with the school district and six times with the
student.709 Courts finding for the student had similar comments regarding intent. For example,
in Thomas, the Second Circuit Court concluded the students were purposeful in working to
keep Hard Times from reaching school grounds. The students typed the articles mostly off
school property, printed the newspapers off-campus, and did not sell them at school. 710 Even
though copies of the newspaper were sometimes secretly stored in the closet of a teacher, the
court did not find this fact significant in showing the students intended for the speech to reach
708
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the school campus.711 In other cases, like the Third Circuit‟s decision in Blue Mountain and
the District Court of Minnesota‟s decision in R.S. v. Minnewaska, courts found the students
took deliberate steps to limit access to the online speech to only their friends.712 Conversely,
in the cases decided in favor of the school districts, students often claimed they never
intended for the speech to reach the school campus, but the courts eschewed those arguments.
For example, in O.Z., the student argued she had no intention for her menacing slide show to
be communicated to anyone outside her home. 713 In fact, though this was not proven, the
student contended her friend was the one who actually posted it on YouTube. The student did
acknowledge she intended to share the slide show with someone, in this case, her friend.
Consequently, the court concluded she did indeed take steps to share the video and rejected
her contention that she did not intend for it to be viewed outside her home.714 In a 2004 Fifth
Circuit decision, Porter v. Ascension Parish,715 a student created a drawing at home of his
school being attacked. He left it at home, with no intention of bringing it to school. However,
his brother brought it to school and school officials found out about it. The Fifth Circuit
inferred since the student had not intended to bring the drawing to school, it should probably
enjoy First Amendment protection. However, since the drawing did make its way to school, a
nexus was developed. As such, the suspension was upheld.716 In the 2002 Pennsylvania State
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Supreme Court case J.S. v. Bethlehem,717 the court held a nexus could be established if the
intent of the off-campus student speech was to target a particular staff member or school and
the student speech either somehow traveled to school via hard copy or was accessed at school
via computer.718 Finally, the Second Circuit in Wisniewski v. Weedsport stated whether or not
the student intended his online speech to reach campus was inconsequential if the speech
created a foreseeable risk of a material and substantial disruption. 719

Reasonable Foreseeability: The Effect of Wisniewski
Wisniewski provides an important distinction for defining jurisdiction, nexus, and
intent which subsequent courts seem to have embraced. Though Tinker was the foundation for
the Second Circuit‟s decision in Wisniewski, it determined a nexus could be established if the
student speech “poses a reasonably foreseeable risk that [it] would come to the attention of
school authorities and that it would materially and substantially disrupt the work and
discipline of the school.”720 The Wisniewski court determined it was reasonably foreseeable
the student‟s IM icon, depicting the killing of a teacher, would come to the attention of both
students and school officials. Additionally, once the icon‟s existence became known, the
possibility of substantial disruption was more than reasonable; it became “clear.”721 As a
result, the Second Circuit concluded when school officials were faced with the potential for
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disruption, the imposition of discipline was acceptable.722 Thus, the Second Circuit
determined a reasonably foreseeable risk of disruption created sufficient nexus to strip the
student of Tinker‟s constitutional protection.723 In six of the seven cases decided after the
Second Circuit‟s 2007 Wisniewski decision, Wisniewski and the Second Circuit‟s finding “that
Tinker can have applicability to student speech that occurs off-campus”724 was discussed at
length.
The Wisniewski panel referenced Tinker in its decision. However, it created its own
two-part test for application when courts were faced with student off-campus expression. The
first part of the Wisniewski test involves a determination of whether there was a reasonably
foreseeable risk the student speech would reach campus and its students or employees.725 The
second part of the test requires a determination of whether the student speech actually caused
a disruption on-campus or if there was a reasonably foreseeable reason to believe if the speech
did reach campus, it would cause a disruption.726 Ultimately, the Second Circuit concluded
the student cyberspeech in Wisniewski went beyond the type of student speech articulated in
the Tinker case into speech that disrupted the educational management of the school727 and
upheld the school discipline. And the Wisniewski court additionally identified Thomas,728
Boucher,729 and Bethlehem730 as decisions providing legal precedent for school officials to
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discipline students for their off-campus speech having the potential to lead to substantial
disruption at school.731
The Second Circuit relied upon Wisniewski in the Doninger v. Niehoff732 decision. The
court observed it was reasonably foreseeable that Avery Doninger‟s offensive online speech
would reach school grounds and, as such, the First Amendment offered it no protection.733
Other federal courts have also discussed Wisniewski‟s application to student speech. For
example, in O.Z. v. Board of Trustees, the court noted school discipline was not proscribed
simply because the speech was created off school grounds because Wisniewski acknowledged
such off-campus speech can lead to a foreseeable risk of on-campus substantial disruption.734
Similarly, in J.C. v. Beverly Hills, the court noted Wisniewski had suggested the substance of
a student‟s off-campus student speech could reasonably portend a substantial disruption at
school.735 In Blue Mountain, Judge Fisher‟s dissenting opinion pointed out the Third Circuit‟s
decision created a split with Wisniewski and placed school officials‟ authority to preserve an
orderly educational environment at risk.736 In Layshock, Judge Jordan‟s concurring opinion
suggested distance between the Third Circuit and the Second Circuit‟s Wisniewski decision.737
He pointed out, however, the Layshock decision came with an understanding that Wisniewski
allowed school officials to discipline students for their off-campus speech.738 Legal scholar
Steve Varel noticed the Wisniewski decision has been relied upon by other courts numerous
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times and, therefore, sees value in courts using Wisniewski‟s reasonable foreseeability test.739
Varel believes the test protects some off-campus student speech while at the same time giving
school officials the authority to discipline students for speech that could “foreseeably reach
campus.”740 However, Varel cautions a court could broadly apply this test and find nearly any
student speech posted on or sent via the internet to have a reasonably foreseeable chance of
reaching the school campus.741 Wisniewski‟s tests could continue to be cited and ultimately
used as the foundation in future court decisions.

Material and Substantial Disruption
As discussed above, Tinker‟s first prong, material and substantial disruption, is the
judicial test the majority of courts apply when analyzing student speech cases.742 Yet applying
Tinker‟s material and substantial disruption prong can be troublesome because courts have not
clearly and conclusively defined what constitutes a material and substantial disruption and
what elements must be present for the disturbances at school to be deemed reasonably
foreseeable.743 California Judicial Clerk Andrew Miller suggests making a determination of
whether student speech has caused or will foreseeably cause a material and substantial
disruption is a major obstacle school officials must overcome in order to justify discipline for
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student expression.744 Thus, the bar should be set high.745 Making matters more difficult for
school officials is the fact that, to date, no courts have applied a specific test to discern if a
material and substantial disruption has occurred.746 However, from what courts have said,
utter pandemonium is not required for a material and substantial disruption to have
occurred.747 Nonetheless something more than an administrator being upset at the content of
the student speech is necessary.748
It would be helpful for school administrators to have clearer direction from the courts
when faced with student cyberspeech incidents. For example, to what degree does the
instructional environment need to be impacted by the student cyberspeech for a material and
substantial disruption to have occurred? Just how much does the student cyberspeech need to
distress a staff member or otherwise divert his/her attention from educating students before it
constitutes a material and substantial disruption? Cases involving these questions will be
addressed below.
Even with the difficulty in answering these challenging questions, Tinker‟s first prong,
the material and substantial disruption prong, was applied in all 16 reviewed cases. So if
Tinker‟s material and substantial disruption prong generally serves as the foundation for lower
court decisions, it is important to define what constitutes a material and substantial disruption.
Black‟s Law Dictionary does not define the term. It does, however, define the legal term
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material as, “Important; more or less necessary; having influence or effect… .”749 Substantial
is also defined as, “Being significant or large and having substance.”750 These definitions are
not very helpful to school administrators. This definitional dearth places school officials in a
quandary when attempting to make decisions regarding off-campus student speech. Though
many commentators reference Tinker and the material and substantial disruption test, few
attempt to define it. However, Justin Peterson, a Florida attorney, suggested in the Michigan
State Law Review that student speech which “retards” the classroom learning process should
be deemed a material and substantial disruption.751 Peterson went on to say racial slurs are
generally volatile enough to constitute a material and substantial disruption.752 Peterson
further asserted student speech resulting in some level of violence may also be considered a
material and substantial disruption.753 Loyola of Los Angeles Law Professor Aaron Caplan
suggests when a student uses inappropriate verbiage in front of a captive audience at a schoolsponsored event, a material and substantial disruption has occurred.754
Though the opaqueness of court views on what constitutes a material and substantial
disruption is an area of confusion for school administrators, some patterns did emerge from
the reviewed court decisions. If the student speech targeted an individual teacher and the
targeted teacher became extremely distraught, making it necessary to alter her or his teaching,
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for some courts this constituted a material and substantial disruption.755 On the other hand,
Klein v. Smith756 suggested because teachers have significant influence on student conduct, a
student directing an inappropriate hand gesture to the teacher at an off-campus location should
have been used as a teachable moment rather than an opportunity to impose discipline.757 In
contrast, when the student speech depicts the murder of a teacher, courts tend to investigate if
the speech should be considered a true threat and did deem this sufficient enough to constitute
a material and substantial disruption.758 Interestingly, in the cases where student speech
targeted school administrators, regardless of how vulgar the speech or how the administrator
reacted, the court generally found for the student.759 When students missed class en masse or
hundreds of phone calls came into the school in response to the student speech760 or the
student speech caused school officials to legitimately fear for the safety of students and staff,
courts determined these results constituted a material and substantial disruption.761 However,
if the speech caused counselors to alter their schedules to deal with issues resulting from the
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speech762 or the speech merely resulted in student hallway discussions, courts generally found
for the student.763

When a Staff Member Has Intense Reactions to a Cyberspeech Attack
When student cyberspeech attacks anyone, including school staff members, it can
gravely affect the victim‟s physical and the psychological health.764 Some courts have
determined if the student speech had some sort of negative effect on the staff member‟s work,
then a material and substantial disruption existed. The courts took into account what the staff
member and teacher described as detrimental consequences of the student speech. Five of the
reviewed cases underscored the negative effects upon the staff member victims of the student
cyberspeech.765 The effect on the staff members included a nuisance,766 extra work,767
stressful phone calls and discussions,768 public humiliation,769 and negatively affected
teaching styles.770 Examples of more serious consequences experienced by staff members
included teachers feeling threatened, becoming ill, or developing sleep-related issues.771 And
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in one instance, the targeted teacher in Bethlehem772 became so disturbed by the contents of a
student-created website soliciting funds to hire a hitman to kill her that she had to undergo
medical treatment, could not leave her home, and was not able to return to school.773 She was
granted a medical leave of absence for the remainder of the school year and for the following
school year. As a result, the educational environment was disrupted because three different
substitute teachers taught the students in her classes at different times during the leave
period.774 The Bethlehem court found discipline valid because the student‟s disparaging
cyberspeech negatively affected school climate.775 Also, since students had to receive
instruction from substitutes, the court determined that a material and substantial disruption
had occurred.776 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court viewed these effects as a sufficient
disruption via Tinker to uphold disciplining the student.
In three of the five cases where courts considered the negative influence student
cyberspeech had on staff members, the court found discipline was warranted. This result begs
an important question regarding the nature of teaching, classroom management, and what
school staff members should expect when dealing with students: How much should school
staff members be expected to tolerate regarding poor decisions adolescents make when they
become irritated or even angry about something an adult at school did? Should teachers be
expected to have reasonably thick skin when it comes to students expressing their frustrations
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off the school campus? In Klein,777 the court acknowledged the student was ill-mannered and
his middle finger gesture to a teacher in an off-campus restaurant parking lot was
disrespectful. But the court refused to believe a student not being punished for giving the
finger to a staff member off-campus or a court refusing to uphold the school district‟s
discipline for this act would cause the “professional integrity, personal mental resolve, and
individual character” of school staff members to evaporate.778
The personal anguish suffered by a staff member in response to a student cyberattack
may have some influence over courts‟ decisions, as evidenced by the aforementioned three
decisions finding for the school district. But should it? Should a staff member‟s fears, perhaps
exaggerated in some cases, have an effect on the administrator‟s decision to impose discipline
or on a court‟s opinion? If courts continue to react in this manner and be influenced by the
severity of the staff member‟s reaction, this places staff members in a strong position. This
power could even be inappropriately wielded. Suppose a staff member decides, when faced
with a student cyberspeech attack, to overreact to the attack. Based on what has happened in a
couple of the cases discussed above, the teacher could claim he/she cannot come to work for
fear of the threats or humiliation the cyberattack may have caused.

When Students Protest and Cause Chaotic Scenes
Due to the substantial disruption caused by Avery Doninger‟s emails and postings, the
court ruled in favor of school officials in Doninger v. Niehoff.779 The Second Circuit has been
777
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criticized for its application of Supreme Court doctrines in student speech cases. For example,
Bradley Gibson, a Cincinnati attorney and legal scholar, asserts the Second Circuit
inappropriately applied student speech benchmarks when deciding Doninger v. Niehoff780
Additionally, Adam Dauksas, a Chicago attorney and legal scholar, noted the court discussed
the particulars of the case by framing it in terms of Fraser781 yet applied Tinker to make its
final decision.782 The flood of phone calls the school received from parents in response to
Avery Doninger‟s email request for them to call, students missing class time to protest outside
the administrative offices, and excessive time administrators had to spend quelling the
protests and fielding the phone calls and emails was enough for the Second Circuit to find a
material and substantial disruption. Additionally, the Second Circuit ultimately rejected
Fraser as controlling in this case, noting, “The applicability of Fraser to plainly offensive offcampus student speech is uncertain.”783 However, one of the factors on which it focused in its
ruling was Avery Doninger‟s use of the term “douchebags” to refer to central office staff, thus
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lending credence to the Second Circuit‟s consideration of Fraser being at least partially
applicable.784
The Second Circuit was thus left to apply Tinker. The court determined Avery
Doninger‟s speech went beyond simply being offensive, exemplified by the aforementioned
phone calls and student protests. In addition, the court noted the discipline meted out to
Doninger did not keep her from educational classroom endeavors; she was not suspended
from school. The discipline dealt only with her being allowed to participate as a class officer,
an optional activity which is a privilege, not a right. The role of class officer required her to
function as a liaison between the student body and faculty/administration.785 After her actions,
it was certainly reasonable to think it would be difficult for this relationship to work properly.

The School District Often Claims a Material and Substantial Disruption
Occurs in Response to the Student Speech

A careful analysis of the 16 reviewed lower court cases shows school officials claimed
a disruption occurred or was reasonably forecast 13 times as a result of the student speech. Of
those 13 cases, the court ruled in favor of the student in nine and found in favor of the school
784
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district in four.786 In the other three cases, school authorities cited violations of school rules or
codes of conduct but did not attempt to link the student speech to a material or substantial
disruption at school.787 For example, in Beussink v. Woodland,788 the school district did not
claim the student speech caused a disruption. Instead, the principal claimed he disciplined
Beussink because he was upset that his inappropriate speech was accessed at school and was
shown on computer screens in classrooms.789 Even so, the court used Tinker and its
substantial disruption prong in making its ruling for the student.

Location, Location, Location
As mentioned previously, many of the courts in the reviewed cases emphasized that an
important consideration in their decisions was whether or not the student speech could be
considered to have occurred either on-campus or off-campus. An issue both school officials
and courts alike must wrestle with is defining the reach of the schoolyard and determining if
school officials have jurisdiction over the off-campus student expression based on the location
of the student speech. Using available information and acting accordingly is the best a school
administrator can do at this point in the absence of a U.S. Supreme Court student cyberspeech
ruling.
786
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School Administrators and Courts Must Ask: Is It Off-Campus or
On-Campus Student Speech?

When formulating a response to off-campus student speech incidents, school
administrators must attempt to define the student speech as either off-campus or on-campus
speech. The distinction is important if challenged in court. Courts must make similar
determinations. Courts have traditionally considered two questions in cases involving the
location of student internet speech.790 The first question is whether student internet expression
can ever be considered to be totally off-campus, given its accessibility virtually anywhere at
all times.791 Second, in suppressing internet speech, are school officials venturing into areas
beyond their purview since the internet is so intertwined in students‟ lives?792 These issues
have made decisions regarding student discipline for cyberspeech incidents difficult because
of school officials‟ competing interests in protecting the school, its students and its staff
members from speech which could substantially disrupt the school environment while at the
same time allowing students to exercise their constitutionally protected rights to free
speech.793 Finally, determining whether the student speech should be considered off-campus
or on-campus cannot be accomplished with broad strokes; it is dependent upon the specific
facts of each case.
Of the 16 cases reviewed, only five courts treated the speech as being on-campus and
another strongly considered the speech to be on-campus before finally deciding it was off-
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campus.794 Of these five cases, one court definitively called the original cyberspeech offcampus until the student accessed it at school. At that point the court treated the speech as
being on-campus. Thus, only five courts labeled the student speech as being on-campus, while
the student speech in the other 11 cases was characterized as occurring off-campus. However,
this on-campus vs. off-campus distinction was not a clear indicator of which party would
prevail with the court. Among the five cases in which the court considered the student speech
on-campus, the court found in favor of the student four times and the school district once.
Surprisingly, students succeeded in court a lower percentage of the time when the speech was
considered off-campus, though this might have just been a function of the small sample size.
In the 11 cases the court deemed the student speech off-campus, students prevailed seven
times and the school district four times. Eight cases involved students posting their speech to
some sort of social media webpage, like Facebook or MySpace. Seven of those eight
decisions went in favor of the student. In three cases, the student emailed the cyberspeech to
multiple people. Courts found in favor of the school district in two of those three cases. Two
other courts heard cases in which the student created a video and posted it on YouTube. Those
decisions were split between the school district and the student.795 One of these YouTube
cases featured graphic images of the teacher‟s murder,796 and the other showcased a song
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containing violent phrases and alleged two male teachers were acting inappropriately with
female students.797

How Did School Officials Hear About the Student Speech?
Another matter brought to the forefront by student plaintiffs in some of the reviewed
cases was the issue of how school officials came to know about the student speech. In seven
of the sixteen cases, someone other than the disciplined student physically brought the speech
to campus or called it to the attention of school officials.798 The third parties included other
students, siblings, and faculty members who were not targets of the speech. Students were
victorious in five of those seven cases.799 Of the five cases students won, the court considered
the speech off-campus three times.800 In the two cases the school district won, both courts
deemed the student speech off-campus.

The Relevance of Regions of the Country
Additionally, location played an important role in the reviewed cases in relation to the
region of the country where the case occurred. Five of the 16 reviewed cases were argued
before Pennsylvania courts. Four were federal courts and one was the State Supreme Court.
Two of the federal courts were decided by the Western District Court of Pennsylvania and
two were Third Circuit Court of Appeals decisions. These four decisions went in favor of the
students. The fifth Pennsylvania case was argued before the State Supreme Court of
797
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Pennsylvania. It was the only state court case in which the fact pattern featured student
cyberspeech attacking a staff member. The court found in favor of the school district.
The United States Census Bureau map shown in Figure 1 dissects the country into four
regions: Northeast, South, West, and Midwest.801 Table 2 provides a list of locations and
decisions of the reviewed cases. Most of the reviewed cases, nine, came before courts in the
Northeast section. Those decisions went in favor of students 6-3. The Second Circuit heard
three of these cases, with two of those decisions finding for the school district. Three of the
reviewed cases took place in the South, with students prevailing twice. The Midwest had two
cases, with a school district and a student each winning one. Decisions also were even in the
Western region of the country, with a student and a school district each winning one.
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Figure 1. Census Bureau Map
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Table 2
Reviewed Cases by Regions of the Country

U.S. Census Bureau
Region

Case

Court

Winning Side

Northeast

Thomas

2nd Circuit

Student

nd

Northeast

Wisniewski

2 Circuit

School District

Northeast

Doninger

2nd Circuit

School District

Northeast

Blue Mountain

3rd Circuit

Student

Northeast

Layshock

3rd Circuit

Student

Killion

Western District Court
of Pennsylvania

Student

Flaherty

Western District Court
of Pennsylvania

Student

Bethlehem

State Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania

Student

Northeast

Klein

District Court of Maine

Student

South

Porter

5th Circuit

School District

South

Evans

Southern District Court
of Florida

Student

South

Bell

5th Circuit

Student

Beussink

Eastern District Court
of Missouri

Student

Minnewaska

District Court of
Minnesota

Student

Emmett

Western District Court
of Washington

Student

O.Z.

Central District Court
of California

School District

Northeast
Northeast
Northeast

Midwest
Midwest

West
West

129
Finally, it appears the type of courts making final decisions in these cases was
important. Final decisions in district courts largely favored students. Eight cases reached final
decision in district courts, with seven of those decisions going in favor of students.802 Seven
other cases went to an appellate court decision, where students won four times and school
districts won three times.803 Finally, as mentioned, the one pertinent state-level case decision
was decided in favor of the school district.804

Conclusion
The line is sometimes blurry when it comes to school administrators‟ decisions
regarding safeguarding students‟ First Amendment rights and supporting a school setting
where students can learn without unnecessary distractions. Amanda McHenry, Cleveland
lawyer and legal scholar, argues just because a person is a student does not give school
administrators the power to discipline her for what she says at home after school.805
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Chapter 4
CONCLUSION

School administrators are routinely confronted with decisions involving a myriad of
important issues, not the least of which is protecting the safety of all persons within the school
setting. This decision-making process is arduous because school officials must also protect
students‟ right to free speech as outlined in the First Amendment of the United States
Constitution.806 Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District expressly
stated students are not stripped of their constitutionally protected right to free speech “at the
schoolhouse gate.”807 Aaron H. Caplan, an attorney for the American Civil Liberties Union of
Washington and the counsel in student speech cases like Emmett v. Kent,808 argues this clear
language implies school administrators must recognize that student speech outside the
schoolhouse gate should be similarly protected,809 “otherwise, they would have nothing to
shed.”810 Conversely, Judge Newman‟s concurrence in Thomas v. Board of Education noted
determining the reach of school officials‟ authority over off-campus student speech might not
be as simple as limiting it to within the walls of the school.811 These diverse opinions are
examples of the quandary school administrators face when confronting student cyberspeech
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incidents. Though courts might not always agree on certain definitions812 or how to handle
incidents in particular cases, school officials must still deal with student cyberspeech incidents
when they arise.

Research, Questions, and Considerations
Research suggests student internet speech can, and often does, have an impact within
the schoolhouse gates.813 This prompts the question, “Is student internet speech ever really
off-campus?” A related question school administrators must ask is, “How far can school
administrators‟ disciplinary arms legally extend into cyberspace?” These queries may be too
difficult to answer when posed singularly, but the lessons learned from case law can be used
to formulate a framework for school administrators to consider when making disciplinary
decisions related to student cyberspeech targeting staff members. Aside from the
aforementioned two questions, school officials must also consider the following: When do
school authorities have jurisdiction to levy discipline for student cyberspeech; did the student
cyberspeech cause a material and substantial disruption within the school environment, and
was the material and substantial disruption reasonably foreseeable?
To protect students‟ constitutional speech rights and to guide decisions about student
speech issues, school officials often rely upon school board policy and board-adopted
handbook language. These written policies must be rooted in clear legal precedent, and in the
area of harassing student cyberspeech, courts have, to date, not provided clear and
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unassailable direction on how school officials should deal with off-campus student
cyberspeech. The appellate courts from the Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Circuits
have dealt with student cyberspeech cases and have offered opinions, although sometimes
incongruent, on the subject of student expression. The Third Circuit and the Fifth Circuit, for
example, have ruled school officials do not have authority to discipline students for
cyberspeech they create at home,814 while the Fourth Circuit has declared student speech
originating from outside the school walls can be disciplined depending on who the speech
targets and what transpires in connection to it.815 In Thomas,816 the Second Circuit grounded
its ruling in the principles of the Tinker817 and Fraser818 decisions and made determinations
based upon the physical location where the speech originated, the substance of the student
speech, and the effect the speech had upon others.819 These are some of the same factors
school officials must take into account when making discipline decisions related to student
cyberspeech targeting staff members.
What follows is a discussion examining these questions surrounding student
cyberspeech which attacks staff members. Each section begins with an overview of court
decisions school administrators should be aware of. The second part of each section provides
thoughts on how courts may rule on future student cyberspeech cases. Next, a tool school
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administrators may use to guide them through an incident of student cyberspeech involving an
attack upon a staff member will be offered. Finally, topics for future study will be suggested.

Thoughts and Advice for School Administrators Faced with Student
Cyberspeech Incidents

Jurisdiction and Nexus Defined
Student cyberspeech targeting staff members remains a gray area for school
administrators. The term “jurisdiction” is defined in the context of this study as school
officials‟ authority to levy discipline. To be on solid constitutional ground, school
administrators must demonstrate that an obvious link exists between the student speech and
the school environment via a strong nexus. Nexus is defined as a point of causal intersection,
link, relation, or connection.820 Nexus considers whether a sufficient link exists between the
student speech and material and substantial disruptions or other incidents within the
schoolhouse gates. An examination of the target of the speech, the ease of accessibility, the
prevalence of the speech, the length of time it was available, and the student‟s intent are all
important factors surrounding nexus the courts have considered. If a nexus between student
cyberspeech and the school can be established, then school administrators have overcome the
first obstacle to imposing discipline. Absent a sufficient nexus, school officials should not
impose discipline.
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Handbooks and Policies Are Powerful Tools
As mentioned previously, current case law remains unsettled in terms of providing
clear direction for school administrators regarding student cyberspeech issues. Consequently,
school administrators faced with student cyberspeech discipline decisions should explore all
possible resources at their disposal. Useful tools for identifying jurisdiction and determining
nexus include student handbooks, signed acceptable use policies, and solid school board
policies. These tools are so helpful, in fact, that using them as the basis for disciplining a
student may make that discipline decision far more clear-cut. By identifying student
cyberspeech which leads to discipline as a violation of school policy or the handbook, school
officials may avoid entanglements with First Amendment issues altogether. For example, in
Thomas, the Second Circuit found discipline for students creating a newspaper replete with
sexual references to be a First Amendment violation.821 In this case, school administrators
identified the reason for the suspensions as the offensive nature of the student speech.822
However, according to the court, had administrators disciplined the students for their oncampus insubordination, a handbook violation, they would have totally avoided the offcampus First Amendment complications which led to court proceedings and ultimately to the
district losing in court.823
The Supreme Court has provided school officials with guidance in crafting appropriate
handbook language via Tinker and the other three major First Amendment student speech
decisions. The Court has identified conditions permitting school officials to either censor or
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restrict student speech, the most common condition being student speech either causing a
substantial disruption of the school environment or reasonably expected to do so.824 These
conditions should be explicitly written in the school district‟s handbook. Other regulations for
student cyberspeech may also be written into handbook language; however, case law suggests
very broad handbook language is not likely to survive judicial scrutiny. Bell v. Itawamba dealt
specifically with this overly broad policy language issue. In Bell, school officials claimed the
student‟s internet-posted rap song attacking the moral integrity of teachers violated school
policy. The school board‟s policy identified harassment as intimidation of teachers as a
serious disruption.825 The Fifth Circuit rejected the argument that any off-campus
communication which criticized teachers was “inherently disruptive.”826 The court observed
that almost all of the offenses listed in the policy under the heading of “Severe Disruptions”
were activities that occur at school, like “running in the hall” and “gambling or possession of
gambling devices at school.”827 Thus, if the language is too broad and attempts to encompass
too much student activity that transpires off-campus, courts are less likely to uphold discipline
even for handbook violations.
The Western District Court of Pennsylvania in Flaherty828 also struck down overly
broad policy language. The Flaherty court determined the sections of the student handbook
school officials relied upon in punishing the student were vague and overly broad and lent
themselves to indiscriminate application.829 Thus, the court found silencing the student‟s
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expression was a violation of the First Amendment and the student handbook unconstitutional
because it failed to include geographic boundaries school administrators should observe when
curtailing student expression.830 The court reasoned the handbook language would give school
officials virtually “unrestricted power”831 over students‟ rights to expression. Specifically, the
court asserted it was unconstitutional for school officials “to discipline a student for …
expression occurring outside of school premises [that was] not tied to a school-related
activity.”832
So, if not overly broad, relevant, specific, and legal policy language will help support
a school district‟s case in court if the student brings suit disputing the legality of discipline for
student expression.833 But this is not an easy process. Though drafting clear and constitutional
handbook language may be difficult, this doesn‟t mean it should not be attempted.834 It is
imperative for school officials to both write and follow solid board policy on the acceptable
use of computers, other electronic devices, the internet, and appropriate cyberconduct. Courts
have recognized school handbooks and acceptable use policies are necessary but nonetheless
unable to address all potential incidents of disruptive student behavior.835 Given this reality,
the Supreme Court has indicated handbooks and acceptable use policies need not “be as
detailed as a criminal code which imposes criminal sanctions.”836 Indeed, it is not feasible to
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expect any school district policy to cover every conceivable student behavior.837 However, the
handbook language and board policy must be as specific as possible and cannot suppress
student speech unless there is a reasonable rationale.838
Effective handbook and acceptable use policy language may not allow school officials
to violate student First Amendment speech rights but it does afford school leaders more
avenues to discipline students for unacceptable cyber-behavior while avoiding the pitfalls and
associated uncertainty when courts become involved with First Amendment violation claims.
Disciplinary decisions grounded in effective handbook and acceptable use policy language,
with documented awareness by both students and parents/guardians, can provide school
leaders with a legally defensive rationale for their decisions.

Location and the Disruption Hurdle
Another jurisdictional consideration for school administrators is the on-campus versus
off-campus nature of the student cyberspeech and any related material and substantial
disruptions. Essentially, if the student cyberspeech in question somehow occurs on-campus, is
accessed on-campus, or reaches the campus,839 school administrators will have crossed the
next hurdle in establishing authority to impose discipline. The subsequent hurdle is the effect
the student speech actually has on-campus. As discussed in Chapter 3, Tinker‟s first prong,
material and substantial disruption, is the judicial test courts apply almost exclusively when
analyzing student cyberspeech cases.840 This first prong provides school administrators with
837
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the most defensible justification for imposing discipline. If the student expression causes a
material and substantial disruption at school, then discipline is more likely to be
constitutionally supported. If, however, the speech or a school disruption connected to the
speech never reaches campus, court decisions suggest discipline may not be constitutionally
supported.841
As discussed in Chapter 3, defining a material and substantial disruption is an
imprecise endeavor. Still, the reviewed cases provide some assistance. Courts in the reviewed
cases have ruled the following types of incidents associated with student speech constituted a
material and substantial disruption:


Students leaving class to protest842



Teachers rendered unable to perform their duties in response to student
speech843



A legitimate fear that someone at school may be in danger844

First, when student cyberspeech has rendered teachers unable to effectively teach and
school officials silence student cyberspeech by disciplining for it, courts have found for the
school district. For instance, when teachers have been so distressed by student cyberspeech
841
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they had to be away from school for a period of time or were so distraught they had to seek
medical attention, the courts have decided against the student.845 These cases featured student
cyberspeech graphically depicting violence aimed at teachers.
It is interesting to note that when school administrators, like the principal or athletic
director, were the targets of student cyberspeech attacks, courts have been less willing to
uphold the imposition of discipline.846 For example, in J.S. v. Bethlehem, Wisniewski v. Board
of Education, and O.Z. v. Board of Trustees, student cyberspeech attacked one or more
teachers.847 Here the student speech included a depiction of harm coming to the teacher. All of
these cases resulted in the court supporting the imposition of disciplinary consequences for
silencing the student speech. However, when school administrators were cyber-targeted, such
as in Killion v. Franklin, J.S. v. Blue Mountain School District, and Layshock v. Hermitage
School District,848 the courts upheld the First Amendment rights of the student. The severity
of the student cyberspeech may be the key piece here. Each of the cases described above
involving teachers depicted or encouraged the death of the teacher. However, the student
cyberspeech targeting school administrators accused them of a variety of sins, including
illegal drug use, excessive alcohol use, theft, and inappropriate relations with students and
parents. Thus, though the administrators were personally attacked and accused of actions
845
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unbecoming a school official, the student cyberspeech did not call for their assassination.
Thus, the courts determined the silencing of the student speech via the imposition of
discipline was a First Amendment violation.
Generally, some type of event must occur at school for a material and substantial
disruption to be declared. The Second Circuit sided with the school district when school
officials silenced students who left class to protest outside the superintendent‟s office in
Doninger.849 However, not every event which happened in connection to student cyberspeech
found favor with the court. Courts determined the following events which occurred in
connection to student speech incidents did not constitute a material and substantial disruption
to the school environment:


Students discussing a racy off-campus publication



A middle finger gesture flipped from a student to a teacher at an off-campus
restaurant parking lot



Webpages created at a student‟s home critical of or even disparaging of school
staff members and their integrity



A webpage inspired by a class assignment which depicted mock obituaries of
the student‟s friends

Tinker’s Second Prong
It should be noted the material and substantial standard discussed here assumes
Tinker‟s first prong will remain the standard for future student speech or cyberspeech cases.
Perhaps a Supreme Court precedent has existed all along but plaintiffs haven‟t asserted the
“right to be left alone” argument and courts have largely not considered it. However, a few
849
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examples do exist where the second prong has been considered as an appropriate test for
student speech situations. In Morse850 the majority suggested benchmarks other than Tinker‟s
material and substantial disruption standard could be used to decide student expression cases.
This suggestion could arguably be interpreted as a subtle approval of the use of Tinker‟s
second prong.851 Relying in part on this Supreme Court possibility, the Ninth Circuit in
Harper v. Poway852determined Tinker‟s second prong did not require a disruption in order for
school officials to prohibit student speech.853 Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit concluded
Tinker‟s two prongs could be applied independently of one another to support school officials
in prohibiting student speech.854 In Harper, the Ninth Circuit upheld school officials‟ removal
of a student from class because the t-shirt he was wearing featured wording critical of
homosexuality.855 The Supreme Court vacated the Ninth Circuit‟s opinion remanding it back
to the Ninth Circuit and instructing the court to dismiss the appeal as moot.856 This
demonstrates one federal appeals court applied Tinker‟s second prong in deciding a student
speech case.
Thus Tinker‟s second prong, addressing student speech infringing upon the rights of
others, may emerge as an independent analytical test in future student speech cases. Should
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this occur, it will be prudent for school administrators to craft associated handbook language
and consider a student victim‟s rights to be left alone. To this point, however, courts have not
embraced Tinker‟s second prong in cases where student speech targets a staff member.

Reasonable Foreseeability – The Effect of Wisniewski
As previously discussed, every court ruling reviewed in this study applied Tinker‟s
first prong, material and substantial disruption, in formulating a decision. This suggests to
school officials that a material and substantial disruption at school connected to the student
speech is a requirement for imposing discipline. However, while this places school
administrators on solid ground to discipline students for their cyberspeech, the Second
Circuit‟s decision in Wisniewski v. Board of Education may represent a different way for
school administrators to approach student cyberspeech cases.857 In Wisniewski, the Second
Circuit focused on the foreseeability of the student speech coming onto campus and causing a
disruption. The court outlined a two-part test to be applied when school officials seek to
discipline a student for off-campus cyberspeech. The first prong of the test asks if it was
reasonably foreseeable the student cyberspeech would be communicated or otherwise become
known to school officials? And second, was the risk of substantial disruption reasonably
foreseeable?858 If the answer to either of these questions is yes, then school discipline would
be permitted.859 Injecting some handbook language incorporating these reasonable
foreseeability tests is another section school officials should add to the student handbook.
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In Summary
Though courts appear to accord some weight to the location of origin of the student
speech, the factors below set forth guidelines for school administrators to consider. The
following bullet points serve to advise school officials on how to proceed when faced with
student cyberspeech incidents targeting school staff members.
Discipline is more likely to be upheld by the courts if:


The student speech has a clear nexus to the school;



The student speech can be clearly connected to a material and substantial disruption on
school grounds;



A teacher suffers substantial negative effects as a result of the cyberspeech attack;



Clear and specific school policies and handbook language are crafted and
administrators follow it;



Students miss class or inhibit the educational process; for example, the student speech
provokes a student walkout.

Absent these impacts, decisions to impose discipline for student speech incidents will be
subject to critical judicial scrutiny.
Other factors to consider:


When malevolent student cyberspeech targets staff members, courts are generally
more protective of teachers than they are of school administrators.



Accessing the school district‟s website does not necessarily constitute being oncampus.



Arguing that a person has the right to be left alone has not been fully explored. Thus,
using it as a reason to discipline for malicious student cyberspeech is tenuous. The
limited use of Tinker‟s second prong suggests courts may view this analysis as more
relevant in cases where the student cyberspeech attacks other students. Thus, at least at
this time, it may not be applicable when the student cyberspeech attacks a staff
member.

144

A Tool for Administrators to Use to Identify Key Elements of Cyberspeech Situations
The tool below, Figure 2, is designed to guide school leaders in gathering,
documenting, and assessing relevant facts when contemplating discipline for incidents of
student off-campus cyberspeech targeting staff members. The tool is not intended to provide a
prescription or formula to be used as a standard for every situation. Of course, every school is
different, every student is unique, and every situation has its own characteristics.
Consequently, school officials must make their ultimate decisions based upon school board
and district handbooks and policies and assess each event on its own merits. At the same time,
it is advisable to take into consideration how other similar situations have been handled by the
courts. The tool is a guide and a way to get facts of the case and administrators‟ thoughts on
paper. It is also advisable to seek guidance from legal counsel before taking major
disciplinary steps in response to student cyberspeech
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.
Student Name and
Grade Level

Parent Contacted

Victim Name/Grade Level

Contact Number

Administrator Completing Form

Considerations
What was the connection between the speech and the
school? Describe the nexus between the student
speech and the school.

Date/Time of Parent
Contact/ Form of Contact

Date

Description & Explanation

Identify the handbook provision or policy that has
been violated.
Did the student speech reach campus? How?
Did a disruption occur? Please identify (then
explain) the types of disruption that occurred in
connection with the student speech. For example:
1) A danger to others was caused as a result of the
student speech
2) Students out of class without permissionmaybe even protesting
3) Teachers unable to perform their duties
4) The educational process was negatively altered
or halted
5) A danger to others was caused as a result of the
student speech
If a disruption did not actually occur, did the student
speech bring about a reasonably foreseeable
disruption from the above list? If so, explain.
Did the student speech infringe upon another‟s right
to be left alone? If so, explain.
Thoughts and Recommendations

Figure 2. Administrator Off-campus Student Speech Documentation Form

Topics for Further Study
This study provides an analysis of the legal environment regarding student free speech
issues in public schools, specifically pertaining to student off-campus cyberspeech attacking
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staff members. It focuses on the constitutionality of administrator disciplinary actions relating
to these matters. Further study surrounding student off-campus cyberspeech would offer
school administrators and others interested in the issue more information to assist in making
decisions regarding how to respond. As these cases continue to come before the courts,
researchers interested in this topic and school administrators as well would be wise to stay
informed as to how courts rule.
One extension of this line of study might include examining the implications of a
teachers' union taking a strong stance in support of a faculty member who has been cyberattacked. Litigation is costly. By focusing on a few states with a strong union presence, a
study looking at how school officials react to incidents of student cyberspeech attacking staff
members in those states would be interesting. This type of study could include comparisons of
how school officials deal with these incidents in strong union states versus states where
unions are not as prevalent.
Gender trends are another issue of potential significance. In other words, the study
would involve an exploration of the incidence of student cyberspeech attacking faculty
members disaggregated by gender. Males are often the gender that first comes to mind when
thinking about bullies. However, females are heavily involved in cyberspeech cases where
school staff members are targeted. The study would gather and report data on the amount,
type, and severity of the associated school discipline, again, disaggregated by gender.
A look at the types of recourse school officials can take outside of the school to defend
against student cyber-attack and the success of those attempts could also prove to be a study
worth considering.
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A study investigating the use of other judicial decisions, e.g., Fraser and Wisniewski,
and their applicability to off-campus student speech (if any) is another area for future
research, as would be further exploration of how Tinker‟s second prong could pertain.
Legal scholars Karly Zande and Mickey Jett point out Fraser and Hazelwood860 called
for schools to educate students about appropriate social behavior.861 Cyberspeech is a form of
communication students often abuse as exemplified in the reviewed cases contained in this
study. Student use of the internet as a means of communication and a sounding board suggests
the need for education on its appropriate use. A study exploring how or if this important area
of education is being done in schools would be useful for educators. It just may be that instead
of wearing armbands as the students did in Tinker, perhaps the internet is today‟s most
appropriate avenue for students to air their views and criticisms of school procedures and
personnel.862 One educator has even called the internet today‟s bathroom wall.863
Perhaps cases argued since the turn of the century involving student-created websites
critical of school officials were really nothing more than those students giving a symbolic
middle finger to school staff members.864 The Klein865 decision supports the stance that giving
the finger in the general public is protected speech for everyone. It follows then that maybe
when students engage in such acts away from school, including in a restaurant parking lot or
in cyberspace, school administrators should make discipline decisions by viewing those acts
860
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as if they were committed merely by members of the general public and not by students at
school.866 However, if Klein had taken a picture of the incident and distributed it via email or
posted it on a website, and someone brought the picture to school, then it is plausible a nexus
to school would have been established and the discipline may have been upheld. This is the
quandary facing school administrators who are presented with instances of student
cyberspeech attacking school personnel.

866

Calvert, supra note 315, at 276.
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Case Summaries

Case
Tinker v.
Des
Moines

Bethel v.
Fraser

Hazelwood
v.
Kuhlmeier

Morse v.
Frederick

Thomas v.
Board of
Education,
Granville
School
District

Klein v.
Smith

Beussink v.
Woodland

Emmett v.
Kent

Year

Highest
Court to
Rule

1969

U.S. Supreme
Ct.,
393 U.S. 503

1986

U.S. Supreme
Ct.,
478 U.S. 675

Students wore armbands to
school to protest war in Viet
Nam. Students were suspended
for it.
Student gave sexually explicit
speech in front of a captive
audience in auditorium at a
school sponsored assembly.

1988

U.S. Supreme
Ct.,
484 U.S. 260

Principal deleted two pages
from student newspaper using
his editorial discretion.

2007

U.S. Supreme
Ct.,
551 U.S. 393

Commonly referred to as the
“Bong Hits for Jesus” case.

1979

1986

1998

2000

2nd Circuit
607 F. 2d
1043

Dist. Ct. of
Maine
635 F. Supp.
1440
Eastern
District Court
of Missouri
30 F. Supp.
2d 1175
Western
District of
WA
92 F. Supp.
2d 1088

Fact Summary or
Identifier

Benchmarks

Decision

1. Material and Substantial
disruption.
2. Infringe on rights of others.
Also, nexus to school.

Decision
for
STUDENT

School sponsored on-campus
speech can be prohibited if it
is lewd, vulgar, indecent.
Schools can proscribe school
sponsored student speech as
long as that decision is made
for legitimate pedagogical
concerns.
School officials can prohibit
student speech at school
events which advocates the
use of illegal drugs.

Student created a website from
home which criticized many
things about his school,
including staff members.

Tinker. No substantial
disruption occurred. The First
Amendment does not allow
school officials to prohibit
what students read or say
when they are away from
school. But a concurring
opinion does leave the “away
from school” door open
Tinker. The First Amendment
protected Klein‟s speech off
school grounds. His gesture,
made off-campus, was not
likely to cause a material and
substantial disruption oncampus.
Tinker. Student speech which
is unpopular but does not
substantially interfere with
school discipline is entitled to
protection.

Student created a webpage
from home which included
mock obituaries and took votes
for who should “die” next.

Tinker. No disruption
occurred in connection to the
website.

Student underground
newspaper created and
distributed off school grounds,
contained vulgarities and other
inappropriate content.

Student gave the finger to a
teacher in a restaurant parking
lot, off school grounds.

Decision
for
DISTRICT

Decision
for
DISTRICT
Decision
for
DISTRICT

Decision
for
STUDENT

Decision
for
STUDENT

Decision
for
STUDENT

Decision
for
STUDENT
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Case

Killion v.
Franklin

J.S. v.
Bethlehem

Flaherty v.
Keystone

Porter v.
Ascension
Parish
Wisniewski
v. Board of
Education

O.Z. v.
Board of
Education

Evans v.
Bayer

Doninger
v. Niehoff

Year

Highest
Court to
Rule

Fact Summary or
Identifier

2001

Western
District of PA
136 F. Supp.
2d 446

Student created at home a Top
Ten list which was disparaging
to the HS AD. Emailed it to
friends. Hard copies showed up
at school later.

State
Supreme
Court of PA
569 Pa. 638
Western
District of PA
247 F. Supp.
2d 698

Student created webpages titled
Teacher Sux.
Student posted on a website
disparaging remarks about a
teacher and about an upcoming
volleyball opponent.

2002

2003

2004

5th Circuit
393 F. 3d 608

2010

2nd Circuit
494 F. 3d 34
Central
District Court
of California
U.S. Dist.
Lexis 110409
Southern
District of
Florida
684 F. Supp.
2d 1365

2011

2nd Circuit
642 F. 3d 334

2007

2008

Student drew a picture of his
school being attacked. Two
years later, his brother brought
the picture to school.
Student created, at home, an
AOL instant message icon of a
gun shooting one of his
teachers in the head.
Student posted on YouTube a
slide show he created which
depicted the murder of one of
his teachers.
Student, from home, created a
Facebook group intended as an
avenue for people to vent about
a teacher.
Student sent a mass email from
school urging others to call the
school to complain about the
cancellation of the Battle of the
Bands. Student was denied
opportunity to be class officer
and to speak at graduation.

Benchmarks
Tinker. The court concluded
school officials had violated
student‟s First Amendment
rights because no evidence of
disruption was produced.
Tinker. Even though J.S.
created the website away from
school, it became on-campus
speech when he opened it at
school.
Tinker. No substantial
disruption occurred in
connection with the student
cyberspeech.
Tinker. The speech was not
political expression and also
constituted a material and
substantial interference with
the operation of the school.
The court also considered
whether the speech qualified
as a “true threat” but
determined it did not.
Tinker. The icon caused a
reasonably foreseeable
disruption to the educational
process.
Tinker. Reasonable for school
administrators to believe the
YouTube post would create a
substantial disruption at
school.

Decision

Decision
for
STUDENT

Decision
for
DISTRICT
Decision
for
STUDENT

Decision
for
DISTRICT
Decision
for
DISTRICT

Decision
for
DISTRICT

Tinker and Fraser. No
substantial disruption and no
vulgarity.

Decision
for
STUDENT

Tinker, Thomas, and
Wisniewski. There were
obvious disruptions.

Decision
for
DISTRICT
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Case
J. Snyder
v. Blue
Mountain
School
District

Layshock
v.
Hermitage

R.S. v.
Minnewask
a

Bell v.
Itawamba

Highest
Court to
Rule

Fact Summary or
Identifier

3rd Circuit
650 F. 3d 915

Student, from home, created an
offensive and tasteless
MySpace profile of the school
principal.

2011

3rd Circuit
650 F. 3d 205

Student, from his
grandmother‟s home, designed
and posted a MySpace
webpage which, using vulgar
language, poked fun at his
Principal.

2012

District of
Minnesota
894 F. Supp.
2d 1128

2014

5th Circuit
2014 U.S.
App. LEXIS
23433

Year

2011

Student posted on Facebook
she hated “Kathy,” a hall
monitor at school. Then posted
a follow up which included
coarse language.
Student created off-campus and
posted off-campus a song on
YouTube and Facebook, which
alleged two coaches/teachers
behaved inappropriately with
female students.

Benchmarks

Decision

Tinker. No reasonable
anticipation of a substantial
disruption.
Tinker. The First Amendment
does not allow school officials
to extend their power beyond
the schoolyard to impose what
might otherwise be
appropriate discipline. No
significant disruption shown.
Tinker, Wisniewski, Doe v.
Pulaski (citing Watts). The
court determined R.S.‟s
speech to clearly be
nonviolent and non-disruptive
off campous speech and as
such, protected by the First
Amendment.

Decision
for
STUDENT

Tinker. No disruption of the
school environment in
connection with the song was
evident.

Decision
for
STUDENT

Decision
for
STUDENT

Decision
for
STUDENT
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Cases Identified As On-campus or Off-campus

Case

Court

Thomas

2nd
Circuit

Wisniewsk
i

2nd
Circuit

Doninger

2nd
Circuit

Blue
Mountain

3rd
Circuit

Student Speech
Type

Creation Location

Newspaper- not
school sanctioned

Mostly off-campus, though
papers were stored at school
and at least some typing took
place at school

YES- students
brought the papers to
school

OFF

AOL Instant Message

Created the online icon at
home

YES- a student
printed out a hard
copy of the icon and
brought it to school

OFF

Email created and sent from
school and webpage created
at home

YES- emails were
sent, student protests
took place

OFF

At student‟s grandmother‟s
home

NO

ON

Mass email.
Subsequent online
webpage created at
home.
MySpace online
profile

Layshock

3rd
Circuit

MySpace online
profile

At student‟s grandmother‟s
home

Porter

5th
Circuit

Picture drawn of
school being attacked

At home

Bell

5th
Circuit

YouTube and
Facebook song
postings

Off-campus

Emailed list to
friends

At home

Website posting

From home and from school

Killion

Flaherty

W.
District
of PA
W.
District
of PA
State

Bethlehem

Supreme

Court
of PA

Did the Speech
Reach School
Campus?

Court
Considered
Speech On
or Offcampus?

Multiple webpage
postings

From home

YES- the student
logged onto the
profile at school
during the school and
showed it to other
students
YES- brother brought
it to school two years
later

ON

OFF

NO

OFF

YES- some other
student brought hard
copies

ON

NO

OFF

YES- student
accessed it at school
and showed it to
other students

ON
The speech
became oncampus when
the student
accessed it at
school
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Case
Klein

Evans

Court
District
Court
of
Maine
So.
Dist.
Court
of
Florida

Student Speech
Type

Creation Location

Student gave the
finger to a teacher

Off-campus restaurant
parking lot

NO

OFF

Facebook postings

At home

NO

OFF

Beussink

E. Dist.
Court
of MO

Website creation

At home

Minnewas
ka

District
Court
of MN

Facebook posting

At home

Webpage

At home

YouTube posting

At home

Emmett

O.Z.

W.
District
Court
of WA
Central
Dist
Court
of CA

Did the Speech
Reach School
Campus?

Court
Considered
Speech On
or Offcampus?

YES- a friend of the
student-creator
accessed it at school
and showed it to a
teacher
YES- one of the
friends which the
student-creator
allowed access
shared it with the
Principal
YES- the news media
found out about it
and ran a story on the
television newscast
YES- the targeted
teacher discovered it
during a Google
search

ON

OFF

OFF

OFF
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Cases

Nexus Notes
No Nexus Established- Finding for Student

Thomas

Klein

Emmett
Flaherty
Evans

Blue
Mountain
Layshock

867

The Second Circuit took the stance that though school officials are responsible for
student speech which is expressed at school,867 they are not allowed by the First
Amendment to prohibit what students read or say when they are away from school.868 As
a result, no nexus was established for the student speech which was away from school.
The court observed that at the time of the incident, the teacher was not performing any
functions as a teacher, the student was not performing any functions as a student, and the
off-campus restaurant where the student speech incident transpired was not on school
grounds nor was there a school function occurring there.869 The student, then, was not
acting in the capacity of a student but as a non-student or community citizen, enjoying
the same free speech rights as an adult. As such, the court found his speech was beyond
the reach of school authority.870 No nexus was thus established.
Since the student‟s online expression took place at home after school hours, the court
surmised it was beyond the jurisdiction of school administrators. Thus, no nexus was
created.
The district court asserted it was a constitutional violation for school officials “to
discipline a student for … expression occurring outside of school premises and [was] not
tied to a school related activity.”871 Thus, no nexus existed.
The district court reasoned even though the student targeted a school employee with her
Facebook posting, it was not enough to put the expression on-campus.872 Furthermore,
the court observed the online speech was created off-campus, it was never accessed nor
brought onto campus, and when its existence came to the attention of school officials, it
had already been taken down.873 As a result, the court did not find a sufficient nexus.874
The student speech was created on a personal computer away from school grounds. The
speech was not accessed at school because the school district took measures with its
computer web filters to prevent students from having the ability to access MySpace.875
Thus, no nexus was generated.
The Third Circuit asserted school administrators‟ reach could not extend into the home of
the student‟s grandmother and cannot be so long as to extend “into Justin‟s [the
student‟s] grandmother‟s home” to impose discipline for what he did there on her
computer.876 So, the court found no nexus.

Thomas v. Board of Education, Granville Central School District, 607 F. 2d 1043, 1049 (2d Cir. 1979).
Judge Kaufman, in writing the court‟s opinion, said school administrators must take care to forbid a couple kinds
of student speech. First, “out of regard for fellow students who constitute a captive audience,” and second, “in
recognition of the fact that the school has a substantial educational interest in avoiding the impression that it has
authorized a specific expression.” Both of these reasons are instructive because the language is nearly identical
to the foundation of the Supreme Court‟s argument seven years later in deciding Fraser and nine years later in its
Hazelwood finding.
868
Id. at 1051.
869
Klein v. Smith, 635 F. Supp 1440, 1441 (D. Me. 1986).
870
Calvert, supra note 315, at 271.
871
Flaherty v. Keystone Oaks School District, 247 F. Supp. 2d 698, 706 (W.D. Pa. 2003).
872
Evans v. Bayer, 684 F. Supp. 2d 1365, 1371 (S.D. Fla. 2010).
873
Id. at 1372.
874
Id.
875
J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain School District, 650 F.3d 915, 929 (3d Cir. 2011).
876
Layshock v. Hermitage School District, 650 F.3d 205, 216 (3d Cir. 2011).
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nonviolent and nonMinnewaska The court determined R.S.‟s Internet postings to be undoubtedly 877

Bell

disruptive off-campus speech and as such, no nexus was formed.
The Fifth Circuit court affirmed the student Internet rap song did not lead to any classes
being disturbed nor was there any upheaval or disorderly conduct at school.878 Moreover,
the court determined the song was completely created and posted to the Internet offcampus. Because school Internet filters blocked Facebook and since student possession
of cell phones was forbidden by school rules, the possibility of accessing the rap song oncampus was greatly reduced.879 Thus, no nexus existed.
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The Pennsylvania Supreme Court opined that just because student speech occurs
away from the school setting does not mean it is exempt from disciplinary action
taken by school administrators.880 The court discovered the school community
became aware of the webpage at least in part because J.S. publicized its existence by
accessing it while at school and showing it to other students.881 These actions created
a nexus.
The student expression was student drawings of the school being attacked. Though
the student did not intend for the drawings to come onto school grounds, a third
party, his brother, brought them on-campus. These two facts created a nexus.
The Second Circuit determined it was reasonably foreseeable that the student‟s
online expression would at some point become known to school staff members,
including its target, his teacher.882 And once the icon did become common
knowledge at school, a foreseeable risk of substantial disruption at school was
manifest, thus creating the nexus.883
The district court did not believe that O.Z. was immune to school discipline just
because she created and posted the slide show away from school.884 The teacher who
was targeted by the YouTube video discovered it after a simple Google search, and
she was severely affected by its contents. Thus, a nexus was created.
The student stirred up students and parents about a perceived injustice by posting a
web blog and sending a mass email, encouraging people to deluge the school
administration offices with phone calls and emails. When, in response to the
student‟s communication, the school office was inundated with phone calls and many
students missed class to attend a protest rally, the nexus was formed.885
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A nexus was established in the following manners: the student‟s Internet posts were
readily accessible to Internet searchers and the posts were accessed at school (though
not by the student-creator). However, the court determined the school administrator‟s
decision to suspend the student was not founded in any concrete legal standard, but
rather in his disdain for the substance of the words the student chose to include in the
website.886
Though the student‟s speech was created at home on a home computer, since his
speech had made its way onto school property, a nexus was created.

Beussink v. Woodland R-IV School District, 30 F. Supp. 2d 1175, 1180 (E.D. Mo. 1998).

